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Abstract
A methodology to assess proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear energy systems is
investigated. The framework, based on Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT), is envisioned
for use within early-stage fuel cycle simulations. Method assumptions and structure are
explained, and reference technology cases are presented to test the model. Eleven metrics are
presented to evaluate the proliferation resistance of once-through, COmbined Non-Fertile and
Uranium (CONFU), Mixed-Oxide (MOX), and Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) fuel cycles.
The metrics are roughly categorized in three groups: material characteristics, material handling
characteristics, and "inherent" facility characteristics. Each metric is associated with its own
utility function, and is weighted according to the proliferation threat of interest.
Results suggest that transportation steps are less proliferation-resistant than stationary
facilities, and that the ABR fuel cycle employing reactors with low conversion ratios are
particularly safe. Nearly all steps of the fuel cycles analyzed are more proliferation resistant to a
terrorist threat than to a host nation threat (which has more resources to devote toward
proliferation activities). The open light water reactor (LWR) and MOX cycles appear to be the
most vulnerable of all cycles analyzed. CONFU proliferation resistance is similar to that of the
ABR with conversion ratios 0.5 and 1.0; these are all approximately in between the values
ascribed to LWR/MOX (at the low end) and ABR with conversion ratio zero (with the highest
proliferation resistance).
Preliminary studies were conducted to determine the sensitivity of the results to
weighting function structure and values. Several different weighting functions were applied to
the utility values calculated for the once-through and CONFU fuel cycles. The tests showed very
little change in the ultimate trends and conclusions drawn from each fuel cycle calculation.
These conclusions, however, are far from definitive. Limitations of the model are
discussed and demonstrated. Recommendations for improving the model are made, including a
call for in-depth evaluation of weighting function structures and values, and an examination of
quantitative links between assumptions and utilities. Ultimate conclusions include that the
numerical values produced by the analysis are not fully and accurately instructive, and analysts
should recognize that the greatest gifts of the assessment may come from performing the
investigation.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Problem of Proliferation
In 1946, prominent Manhattan Project scientists gathered and debated what to do about
the link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. They recognized at that time that the
technology behind nuclear power could be used for good, as a source of civilian electricity, or
could be harnessed for extreme explosive power. They feared that instability in a nuclear-armed
world would bring about wars of unprecedented destruction, and so codified strategies to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons technology in what became known as the Acheson-Lilienthal
report.
Over sixty years after the end of World War II, we have yet to see another nuclear
weapon detonated in a populous area. This is due in part to the success of the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) regime. Recent socio-political tensions, however, threaten to break this history of
nuclear peace. New countries are seeking nuclear weapons, and as each one succeeds, the fear of
a nuclear attack becomes more real. This process of garnering nuclear capability is called
"nuclear proliferation," and usually refers specifically to the spread of nuclear weapons. The
term often describes a transfer from states that possess the technology to states that do not, but it
can also refer to the acquisition of weapons knowledge by subnational groups or terrorists.
A second problem facing humanity today is the potentially grave set of consequences
associated with global climate change. Scientists mostly agree that the world is warming, and
that at least part of the cause of the warming is human-generated carbon dioxide. CO 2 levels in
the atmosphere are higher now than they have been ever in earth's measurable history.[1] In the
United States, about one-third of the CO 2 we generate comes from the transportation sector, and
most of the rest is produced during electricity generation. The electricity sector relies most
heavily on coal for its fuel; burning coal produces large amounts of CO 2.
Among proposals to counter climate change is for the world to increase its reliance on
nuclear power. Indeed, countries all over the world have observed recent improvements in
nuclear power plant safety and efficiency, and are considering building new nuclear generation.
The primary effluent from a nuclear plant is hot water or air; life-cycle CO2 emissions per
gigawatt-hour electric (GWeh) for a nuclear plant are less than one-twentieth those of a coal-
fired plant (see Fig. 1.1). For all of these reasons, nuclear energy may be slated for a global
renaissance.
A global expansion of nuclear generating capacity will require a concomitant increase in
nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Such facilities are a primary focus of proliferation concern,
especially those built for enriching uranium and those for reprocessing spent fuel. Technological
advances in nuclear fuel technology hold the promise of cheaper, more efficient, safer, and even
more proliferation-resistant processes.
Moving Nuclear Technology Forward
Government initiatives in the past few years have aimed to expand nuclear power
generation. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included incentives for building new plants,
including loan guarantees and tax credits. Finally, in mid-2007, the first applications for plant
licenses are in the hands of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Other policies,
sometimes short-lived or even in conflict with one another, have targeted the back-end of the fuel
cycle. Powerful political forces have battled over the proposed geologic repository at Yucca
Mountain; the Department of Energy is now in the process of preparing a license application.
Various programs, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), have kept scientific and
engineering research on reprocessing technologies afloat. The current Administration is now
trying to bring those technologies to commercial reality in the U.S.
On February 6, 2006, President George W. Bush announced a specific policy intended for
encouraging the safe development of nuclear power. The initiative is called the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP), headed by DOE. The domestic thrust of GNEP includes plans to
build an advanced fuel recycling facility and an advanced burner reactor, to demonstrate and
deploy UREX+ reprocessing technology, and to expand nuclear energy generally. The
international aspects include research to advance safeguards technology, and to implement a
fuel-leasing program whereby "supplier" nations would enrich fuel, send it to "user" nations, and
then would accept the fuel back for reprocessing or disposal.[2] The policy thus aims to use both
technological and institutional arrangements to encourage nuclear power while decreasing the
likelihood of nuclear material proliferation.
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Figure 1.1 Carbon Emissions by Electricity Source[3]
Historically, the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) has spearheaded government-
supported development of nuclear technologies. NE houses the primary coordinating office for
GNEP, and is beginning work already with industry partners to define the advanced facilities.
By contrast, it is usually the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within DOE that
has primary expertise in safeguards and international nuclear agreements. NNSA also tends to
deal with proliferation issues in conjunction with the Department of State.
In order to adequately address the connection between civilian technology and nuclear
weapons, NE and NNSA will need to work together. As the world moves toward new, advanced
fuel cycle equipment, these U.S. government bodies should work with international partners and
should design-in safeguards for nuclear systems. The safeguards systems currently in use were
added to nuclear facilities after the facilities were designed. One goal for the advanced
generation of nuclear power is inclusion of safeguards technology from the beginning of facility
design and development. Assessing and comparing the elements that make these systems more
or less resistant to proliferation can help focus efforts to design well-safeguarded facilities.
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1.2 The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and Safeguards
The NNSA can decrease the probability of successful proliferation in two primary ways:
(1) institutionally, through rules, inspections, and international agreements, and (2)
technologically, by adding or enhancing technological barriers to successful weapon detonation.
These barriers may be designed as "passive" protections against proliferation; like passive safety
features, these could be natural barriers that are closed or added if security is breached.
As mentioned above, measures to combat proliferation have generally been added to
nuclear facilities after they are designed and built. New generations of nuclear facilities will
benefit from designing-in, as much as possible, safeguards that make the material either difficult
to use in weapons or easier to track under institutional arrangements.
The NPT
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970.[4] According
to the Federation of American Scientists, there were 185 signatories to the treaty as of December
3, 1998. The treaty established five nuclear weapons states (NWS), including the U.S., Britain,
China, France, and Russia. In exchange for other countries' acceptance that these states have
weapons, and their solemn promise not to develop weapons of their own, the NWS have offered
technical assistance and approval to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) who wish to develop
any piece of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, NWS have pledged to drastically reduce
their nuclear arsenals with the goal of eventual eradication.[4]
Although the treaty has been largely successful for nearly 40 years, with only three new
states acquiring weapons capabilities, it is now facing difficulty. NNWS complain that the NWS
are not working hard enough to disarm. NWS fear that by allowing NNWS access to all aspects
of the nuclear fuel cycle, NNWS can come nearly all the way to possessing nuclear weapons
while still acting under NPT agreements. This is especially true for states that build uranium
enrichment facilities or that build reprocessing plants and thus gain access to weapons-suitable
materials.
Safeguards
The primary operating arm for the NPT, working to ensure compliance with treaty
obligations, is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA has inspectors that
are dispatched to NNWS in order to verify that their nuclear activities are geared solely toward
their civilian power systems. In addition to on-site inspections, the IAEA uses various types of
safeguards equipment, such as electric sensors and seals that indicate if nuclear material has been
diverted or if tampering has occurred. Both the IAEA and private security forces make use of
cameras to ensure that no state-sponsored or illicit actor gains access to nuclear material.
In general, the NWS do not receive visits by IAEA inspectors. They do, however, have
extensive safety and security systems for both military and civilian nuclear sites. The U.S.
especially has improved security since 9/11, and many power plants now have layered fences,
cameras, nuclear detection portals, and armed guards.
Barriers to proliferation are generally separated into "intrinsic" material characteristics
and "extrinsic" barriers like cameras, external security systems, and institutional arrangements.
Intrinsic safeguards include things like the isotopic composition of the material, which can
render uranium or plutonium difficult or impossible to fashion into a nuclear explosive. A highly
proliferation-resistant system will necessarily include unfavorable material characteristics for
weapons, strong safeguards systems, and international agreements that discourage nuclear
weapons proliferation.
1.3 Past and Current Proliferation Resistance Assessments
Technologists and policymakers have long been interested in establishing a method to
assess vulnerabilities in civilian nuclear fuel cycles. The approaches and outputs vary, but many
methods seek a quantitative expression that links fuel cycle characteristics to the likelihood that a
proliferator will successfully obtain and detonate nuclear material. Some of these quantitative
assessments calculate proliferator success probabilities, comparing different pathways for
gaining material. Others try to aggregate various technical characteristics of the material, to
determine what type of material makes a likely proliferation target.
All proliferation resistance assessments suffer from inherent uncertainties in the
interaction between a proliferator and safeguarder. It is not possible to know exactly what a
proliferator's capabilities are, or to know what will be his actions in the face of various technical
or institutional barriers. Nevertheless, policymakers and scientists must decide when and how to
expend resources on safeguarding nuclear technology. A method for assessing proliferation
resistance at early stages of fuel cycle development, in order to find proliferation vulnerabilities,
could help maximize the impact of designed-in safeguards.
The first proliferation resistance assessments were initiated in the 1970s, when it became
clear that the pure streams of plutonium created during Plutonium Extraction and Recovery
(PUREX) reprocessing posed a proliferation risk. The U.S. undertook a domestic study called
the Nonproliferation Alternative System Assessment Program (NASAP).[5] The report of the
group discussed, among other topics, the technological, economic, safety, and environmental
considerations associated with nuclear power and proliferation. An international group released
its report that same year; under the auspices of the IAEA, the international report was known as
the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)[6]. These two reports formed the basis
of the Carter administration policy banning domestic reprocessing of spent fuel. Though other
presidents reconsidered the nonproliferation basis for the policy, reprocessing was still rejected
on economic grounds. As a result, the U.S. has not built any reprocessing facilities since 1980,
and only recently has President George W. Bush vigorously instigated plans for new plants
(February, 2006).[7]
In his 1978 MIT thesis, loannis Papazoglou presented a proliferation resistance
assessment method based on Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT). Papazoglou compared
different fuel cycle systems and pathways to proliferation within each system, using the broad
measures of monetary cost, weapons development time, inherent difficulty, weapons material,
and warning period.[8]
R.A. Krakowski combined Papazoglou's methods with some later studies to produce yet
another assessment methodology in 2001. Krakowski's method was also based on MAUT, but
included a wider set of metrics than did Papazoglou's work.
In 2001, the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC), a Department of
Energy (DOE) body, commissioned the next important study of proliferation resistance. A task
force produced the report "Technological Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance
of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS)." They provided an oft-cited set of "barriers"
to proliferation resistance, intended to characterize the difficulties presented to a would-be
proliferator. Their ultimate conclusion was that no "technological silver bullet" exists which can
definitively break the connection between civilian power and nuclear weapons. The group
contended that any technical efforts to prevent proliferation would need to be complimented by
institutional barriers.[9]
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) convened its own working group
in 2003. This group, called the Nonproliferation Assessment Methodology (NPAM) working
group, released its report in May of 2003. The report provides guidelines for performing
nonproliferation assessments. These guidelines focus on three methods: MAUT, probabilistic or
"pathway" analyses, and two-sided methods that pit proliferator against safeguarder. The report
suggests metrics for use in a MAUT study, and these, along with TOPS barriers, contribute to the
metric choices in this thesis.[10]
William Charlton at Texas A&M provided a MAUT analysis that included a utility
function for each metric. Using expert elicitation, Charlton established weights for 14 metrics
that contribute to proliferation risk. He aggregated the metrics for a fuel assembly in each stage
of a fuel cycle, and concluded that the once-through cycle is actually roughly equal in
proliferation resistance to some recycling strategies; the one exception was the reprocessing step,
at which proliferation resistance dove considerably lower than all other points.[ 11]
In his 2006 thesis, Mark Visosky evaluated the proliferation resistance of advanced
recycling strategies in thermal reactors.[12] He built on work by Thomas Boscher,[13] using
five metrics and multiplying them together to create a vulnerability index for nuclear fuel.
Visosky also explored the use of discounting, observing that proliferation risks may change in
the future as fuel sits at repositories and cooling sites.
Finally, the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Committee of the
Generation IV International Forum is completing perhaps the most comprehensive proliferation
resistance assessment framework yet developed. The Generation IV Forum is an international
collaboration established in 2000 to facilitate research on advanced nuclear systems. In 2002,
the PR&PP Expert Group was convened to develop a methodology for assessing and designing
proliferation resistant features for these systems.
The PR&PP methodology uses pathway analysis, where proliferation targets are
identified and success probabilities are calculated for a range of threats. The probabilities form
the basis of pathway comparison, and help identify system vulnerabilities. Characteristics of the
material, facilities, and safeguards all contribute to high-level measures, which in turn represent
the proliferation vulnerability of a system pathway. The high-level measures for proliferation
resistance, defined as those expressing the robustness of the system to host-nation-type threats,
are proliferation technical difficulty, proliferation resources, proliferation time, fissile material
quality, detection probability, and detection resources. For physical protection, defined
differently as the robustness of the system to attack by subnational individuals or groups, the
measures are probability of adversary success, consequences, and physical protection resources.
The intent of the expert group is that the methodology will be used iteratively during the design
of advanced nuclear systems; during initial stages, only rough design information would be
available, and so the analysis would be correspondingly rough, but proliferation analysis would
increase in complexity as it informed changes to the gradually more complex system.[14]
All of the aforementioned studies have directly or indirectly influenced the work in this
thesis. The early NASAP and INFCE studies are mentioned because they are considered the
founding studies in the area of proliferation resistance assessment. The other reports described
here, though not comprehensive of all work in the proliferation assessment corpus, are those
which contributed heavily to the methodology in this thesis (see Chapter 2). Other reports that
aided the project include two Ph.D. dissertations: (1) a pathway-type facility analysis by
Hyeongpil Ham (MIT Nuclear Engineering),[15] and (2) a probabilistic analysis of terrorist
proliferation opportunities by Matthew Bunn (MIT Engineering Systems Division).[16] Ham's
thesis investigated proliferation pathways within a pebble-bed nuclear reactor system. His
choices of metrics for evaluating the pathways heavily influenced those chosen in this study
(especially spontaneous fission, and some material handling characteristics). Bunn investigated
routes by which terrorists might acquire and detonate nuclear weapons. He evaluated the
probability of a proliferator obtaining, processing, and then successfully delivering a weapon.
He links the probability of successful material processing with metrics such as the quality (e.g.
fission, decay heat, and radioactivity) of the material.
1.4 Coupling Fuel Cycle Simulations to Proliferation Resistance Assessment
The first steps in designing nuclear fuel cycles and facilities are comprised of extensive
simulation. New fuels are envisioned, their composition often based on a desired recycling
strategy. The isotopic vectors of such fuels are then fed into codes like CASMO that simulate
the reactor environment. In this way, nuclear engineers can study the effect of new fuels on
neutronic and thermal hydraulic parameters as well as on a reactor's energy output. The first and
primary goal is obviously to develop a working reactor with parameters well within regulatory
safety limits. Once this is complete, designers usually turn to economic considerations. The
result is a simulation of a fuel cycle that is optimized for safe energy production as well as for
cost.
At this stage of advanced fuel cycle design, the specifics of nuclear facility layout and
content are mostly unknown. The precise methods used for transporting, cooling, and even
reprocessing the fuel are still variable; simulations require only that the isotopics are fixed (with
the assumption that fuel production would be possible).
After reactor parameters and fuel composition are established, it is possible to simulate
the fuel cycle as a whole, using a tool such as the Code for Advanced Fuel Cycle Assessment
(CAFCA) developed at MIT.[17] CAFCA simulates nuclear facilities as each one big black box.
No facility details or characteristics are modeled; the idea is to determine how many facilities are
needed, and how the rough material properties in the system change with time. Bulk material
properties, the impact on legacy spent fuel, and the ability to meet future electricity demands are
all considered in the model. The output can include a range of information: one example is the
number of reprocessing facilities needed for a particular energy growth model and advanced
reactor type, implemented at a certain date. Important questions can be asked at this stage about
the effect of the strategy on nuclear proliferation potential.
One question is: where in a fuel cycle are the greatest vulnerabilities to nuclear
proliferation? In other words, which fuel cycle segments have material that is attractive to
proliferators, who would seek to divert the material from the facility at that segment? Are there
processes or fuel aspects at that segment, which cannot be altered in the face of reactor
requirements, that make nuclear material easy to steal? Are there segments which offer
particular knowledge useful to a nation wishing to build a nuclear weapon through breakout or
clandestine facilities? Where is the probability of diversion too large (and how do we decide
what is "too large")?
Another set of questions can be asked about the general comparison of one fuel cycle to
another. For example, one might ask: is the MOX fuel cycle inherently more susceptible to
certain types of proliferation than is the once-through fuel cycle?
These questions are difficult to answer; indeed, even with excellent information on the
precise characteristics of a facility, there is no universally accepted method to evaluate or
compare the probability that proliferation will occur. The task of evaluating proliferation
resistance becomes even harder if facilities are not yet designed, as the questions center on fuel
cycle designs which consist only of isotopic vector simulations and material flow assumptions.
Yet policymakers and engineers are curious about proliferation impacts even at this early stage.
If it is possible to say something about proliferation resistance of an advanced cycle early on,
then extra attention could be focused on designing-in safeguards for facilities that are desired but
vulnerable.
The objective of this research, then, is to propose a methodology to evaluate, at an early
stage, the proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycles. The initial goal was to create
a program that would run with CAFCA, such that CAFCA users could explore the proliferation
impacts of fuel cycles in addition to CAFCA's other results. While the proliferation resistance
code was never officially integrated into CAFCA (due to changes in CAFCA's design), the goal
has remained creation of a program that would work with computerized fuel cycle models.
1.5 Thesis Objectives
In this thesis, a methodology is developed to examine the proliferation resistance of each
cycle, with the aim of discovering inherent vulnerabilities in fuel cycles before they are designed
and built. The methodology is applied to several different nuclear fuel cycles as example cases,
comparing their robustness in the face of proliferation attempts by host nations and terrorist
actors.
The aim of this work is not to provide definitive answers to the questions posed above
about the proliferation resistance of given nuclear systems. Rather, the intent is to explore a
methodology, observing its strengths and weaknesses in evaluating nascent nuclear systems.
The goal ultimately is to contribute to finding a proliferation assessment framework that will
work within preliminary fuel cycle computer simulations.
Chapter 2 describes the development of the methodology. The framework was created
with several constraints in mind: the methodology should be simple and easy to understand,
should rely as much as possible on inherent characteristics that will not change throughout fuel
cycle facility development, and should be amenable to use within a computer simulation.
Throughout Chapter 2, the methodology used in this thesis is compared to those used in other
proliferation resistance assessments. The choice to use MAUT as a base methodology and
choices on individual metrics and structures are justified, and in explaining those choices,
limitations of the methodology are revealed. If some of the problems posed by these limitations
can be remedied, the methodology could provide the basis for a computerized proliferation
resistance assessment system.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 further explore the feasibility of using this type of assessment.
Chapter 3 describes example technology cases and the implementation of the assessment
methodology to evaluate the proliferation resistance of those nuclear technologies. Chapter 4
describes the results of proliferation resistance calculations for these systems, and compares
them to past analyses and results. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of this work as
well as recommendations for policymakers and for further research.
Despite limitations on the methodology, this work aims at least to contribute to the basis
for judging the strengths and weaknesses of MAUT. MAUT methods seek to break a problem
down to its component parts, and force assessors to evaluate the primary drivers to undesirable
outcomes. Even if experts disagree on the viability of this method's results, the analyst might
help them pinpoint the assumptions on which they disagree and focus on the sources of greatest
uncertainty. Early discussions of this sort should contribute to identifying potential proliferation
problems in our future nuclear systems, and should enable policymakers and scientists to
properly focus their attention on making such systems less vulnerable.
Chapter 2 - Methodology
2.1 Method Choice: Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
Why MAUT
As mentioned above, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) is one of three strategies
commonly employed in proliferation resistance assessments. The other two mentioned by the
NPAM guidelines are scenario or "pathway" analyses, and two-sided or "wargaming" methods.
In practice, these latter two methods are often used together. Wargaming involves putting
oneself in the position of a proliferator and then in that of a safeguarder, to determine what each
would do in response to the other. The method thus identifies which pathways are most
promising for a proliferator to follow.
Once such pathways are identified, the assessor can complete a scenario analysis.
Scenario analysis involves evaluation of different pathways to proliferation. The goal is
ultimately to determine which proliferation paths are most difficult and which are most likely,
based on the characteristics of the nuclear material as well as facility design and safeguards.
Vulnerabilities are discovered where a proliferator would have a high chance of proliferation
success.
Because early fuel strategy simulations do not involve any facility design, scenario
analysis was deemed improper for the particular task of this thesis work. As described above,
the only available inputs at the early stage of fuel cycle development are isotopic fuel vectors. A
proper scenario analysis is most useful when information is available not only about isotopics,
but also about the structure and safeguards systems at a nuclear facility. This is unfortunate;
scenario methods are more complete and often found to be more informative.
Others might argue that in fact, even with limited design information, coarse pathways
can be defined and initial proliferation resistance analyses performed. Indeed, this is the thrust
of the PR&PP Gen IV expert group project. The implementation of a pathway and probability
framework would be useful at early stages, especially if it is intended to evolve in complexity
alongside the technology. But the pathway construction and analysis is probably best done
outside a computer program. The most useful information at this stage of a pathway analysis
would be in discovering where pathways exist and how they might change. Those discoveries,
unlike rote probability calculations, would be difficult or impossible to automate.
The hope is that MAUT can provide a first-cut look at proliferation characteristics of
advanced systems. Perhaps future scenario analyses of the systems' later designs can be built on
the MAUT methodology presented here.
General MAUT Principles Used in this Study
The following sections describe in detail the method used for this MAUT-based analysis.
Sections 2 and 3, outlining the threat definition and safeguards context for the study, represent
the assumptions used in creating the model. The fourth section demonstrates the segmentation of
the fuel cycle into steps that correspond closely to the facilities involved; this segmentation is
common to nearly all fuel cycle analyses.
Section 5 describes the metrics chosen for evaluation in this study. The metrics were
chosen according to the principles that the metrics should be:
* as much as possible, independent of one another,
* as few as possible,
* simple and easy for policymakers with non-scientific backgrounds to understand,
* amenable to use within a computerized fuel cycle simulation, and
* measurable by the quantities known at an early stage of fuel cycle development (i.e.
should be measurable by attributes equivalent to or related to the isotopic composition of
fuel at a given segment).
Each metric is associated with a utility function, which translates a measurable property of
nuclear material into a measure of proliferation resistance.
The final section of this chapter describes the weighting function used to aggregate the
metrics for each segment. MAUT theory dictates that this function may have any of several
structures. For example, in Mark Visosky's research, all metrics were multiplied together
without any separate weighting. In our work, a linear-additive function is used and tested
somewhat for robustness in Chapter 5; future work should further evaluate the validity of this
model and weighting function.
Limitations of MAUT
One broad impediment to this methodology's implementation is the inability of a MAUT-
based proliferation resistance assessment to "include everything." MAUT is tricky because it
works best and most simply when metric elements are independent; this is a tall order for nuclear
assessments, where material qualities such as "radioactivity" and "heat production" are often
inextricably linked. In addition, there may be some "unknown unknowns" which contribute to
the proliferation risk of one system or another, but are completely invisible to the assessor.
These issues are explored further in section 2.5.
2.2 Threat Space Definition
In order to perform a proliferation resistance assessment, some assumptions must be
made about the characteristics of the proliferator. Two proliferator types are considered here: a
subnational terrorist and a host nation with fairly low technological capability. The term "host
nation" indicates a country that is home to some sort of nuclear facility. The particular facility
could be any in the fuel cycle, but presumably is part of an international advanced fuel cycle
strategy. Both subnational and host state threats are assumed to act by diverting nuclear material.
The assumption that a proliferator acts only by diversion deserves some explanation.
Until now, this document treats the term "proliferation" as loosely meaning "acquisition of
nuclear material by an actor with intent to detonate a nuclear weapon." According to the
Proliferation and Physical Protection (PR&PP) working group for the Generation IV
International Forum (GIF), there is a distinct difference between stealing nuclear material and
otherwise creating material that is weapons-usable. The PR&PP group describes the act of
safeguarding material from theft as "physical protection." "Proliferation," on the other hand,
refers to a country (or presumably, a HIGHLY technologically advanced subnational with some
sort of sanctioned area of operation) working to develop facilities and know-how to produce
nuclear material and ultimately a nuclear weapon. By these definitions, the sole focus of this
work is physical protection.
Clandestine operations of facilities or NPT "breakout" scenarios are not considered. A
subnational would presumably steal nuclear material, most likely in a single raid due to
heightened difficulties associated with multiple attempts. This is considered "theft" rather than
diversion, but the scenarios are somewhat similar in that material is removed for nefarious
purposes. Host nations would divert material against their NPT agreements, defying IAEA
technical safeguards as well as inspectors. A host nation would almost certainly use insiders,
directing various staff of a nuclear facility to remove material. A terrorist cell could also employ
some insiders, though they would probably have access to fewer people; if terrorist insiders
diverted material slowly over some period of time, the effect would be similar to that of a host
nation diverting the material except that the terrorist would probably have fewer resources with
which to process the stolen goods. Indeed, there may be some merging of characteristics of the
two threats considered. For example, a host nation might use its own people to stage a "terrorist"
attack and steal material.
Below (Table 2.1) is a summary of further threat characteristics.
Table 2.1 Threat Characteristics (based largely on [10])
AcIo Objectives I Capabilities I
Threat Probable Number of Yield of Reliability Proliferation Delivery
Type Motivation Weapons Weapons Percentage Method Method
Desired Desired for Weapon
Sub- inflict terror 1 or 2 Any Any theft truck/boat
national (suitcase
party bomb)
Host national 1 to 2 or 3 Any 50-95 clandestine plane, truck,
State security (cost and to 20kt diversion of boat, missile
tech material from
barriers civilian
prevent facilities
more)
The characteristics of proliferators assumed in this case are based on categories used in
the NPAM guidelines; the two threats correspond roughly to NPAM categories 1 and 3.[10]
Because both actor-types have low levels of technological capability, we assume that neither has
the ability or resources to perform uranium enrichment. Each can, however, perform some
chemical separation of elements (e.g. to separate plutonium from other constituents of spent fuel).
We do not make a specific assumption about the resources each threat possesses; in
general, we assume both proliferators have access to large amounts of money and personnel, but
these sources are finite. Technical barriers that increase the cost of obtaining or detonating a
nuclear weapon will therefore act as deterrents.
The probable motivation of the proliferator is the reason that the actor wants a nuclear
weapon. In general, the aim of terrorists is to inflict terror, scaring (and even killing) as many
people as possible. One way in which terrorists could do this is with a "dirty bomb," or a
conventional explosive laced with radioactive isotopes. According to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the actual numbers of deaths resulting from a dirty bomb detonation would depend
almost entirely on the characteristics of the explosive and not on the radioactive elements.[18]
Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) would probably cause more fear and panic than a
conventional bomb, but RDDs are not considered in this study. The assumption is that the
subnational would want a fully nuclear explosive.
A national actor, by contrast, would like an especially reliable nuclear weapon to
guarantee national security. A country might sell a less reliable bomb to terrorists for cash; this
scenario is equivalent to ultimate terrorist acquisition of nuclear material, but with greater
resources to bring to bear on successfully performing diversion. If a host nation truly wants
nuclear material for its own uses, it would desire high explosive reliability in order to deter
conventional or nuclear attacks by its enemies.
The following characteristics and objectives of the proliferators relate directly to their
motivations. A terrorist needs a relatively small number of weapons, requiring just one critical
mass of material (providing it detonates successfully). A host nation, on the other hand, would
probably be more comfortable possessing at least 2 or 3 weapons in order to create a credible
deterrent. This means, for example, that a host nation may want to develop processes that will
quickly give them several whole critical masses of nuclear material.
The effective yield and reliability values are not of vital importance to a terrorist (or
subnational). Though a terrorist would certainly want as high a yield as possible and a
successful detonation, with "nothing to lose," a subnational might settle for material with even
low chances of achieving a significant explosion size. Whether the subnational accepts the low
yield probability will depend on the resources he must expend to acquire the material.
The yield and reliability parameters are much more important to a host state. In the case
that a host nation would threaten using nuclear force, it would prefer its threat to be credibly
backed. An arsenal of low-yield, low-reliability of weapons would be useless if the parameters
became known to the host nation's enemies. Yet the yield and reliability do not have to be
especially high; the uncertainty in the parameters would afford the country at least some
protection.
The proliferation method was discussed above: subnationals would likely steal material
from a facility, while national actors would avert safeguards and divert nuclear material. Either
threat type could act in one attack or over time, but terrorists are more likely to be successful
using a single attack, whereas nations might well exercise the option of clandestinely diverting
small amounts of material little by little. Either threat might also purchase nuclear material or
weapons, but this proliferation route is not considered here (see next section on threat space
limitations).
Finally, the delivery method employed by host nations is likely to be more sophisticated
than the weapons delivery system used by a subnational actor. For both low-technology threats
and the purposes of this study, the delivery method has little impact on decisions to divert
nuclear material. Once higher-tech threats are considered, the desire to make small and reliable
warheads for use on planes and missiles might significantly affect the types of material sought.
Limitations of the Threat Space Definition
There are many challenges to obtaining a high-quality threat space definition. Among the
most important is that the threat described above may not be the most pressing. A proliferator,
either terrorist or host state, would likely be most successful if he/they focused all efforts on
procuring an intact nuclear weapon, rather than try to create one from a civilian power cycle.
The U.S. and Russia have together made great strides in securing nuclear weapons around the
world, especially those left vulnerable in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Nevertheless, black
market operators like A.Q. Khan in conjunction with rogue regimes like North Korea may
establish an easier route to nuclear weapons. Other studies evaluate this possibility (see, e.g. the
work of Matthew Bunn, [16]), but here the focus is on proliferation as it relates to civilian
nuclear power. Even though acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon may be more likely (it
would certainly provide for a higher probability of successful detonation), policymakers and the
public nevertheless worry that nuclear material from civilian power facilities represents a
vulnerability.
Once the focus has been narrowed to civilian nuclear power systems and the proliferation
risk they pose, further limitations emerge. A proliferator is an inherently unpredictable character.
Great uncertainties exist about the capabilities, motivation, rationality, and intelligence of an
operator desiring a nuclear weapon. For this reason, it will never be possible to fully and
definitively characterize proliferation risk. PRA has long been used in safety evaluations at
nuclear plants, but there the components evaluated are mechanical, and may have well-
understood failure rates. Though the human response element provides some uncertainty with
PRA, the human proliferator introduces far greater uncertainties with proliferation resistance
assessments.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for this study, the threat definition is not explicitly
linked to the metrics and weighting function. Rather, the specifics of the definition provide an
example and a general guideline for thought; the metrics reflect the threat definition in that
increased difficulty in obtaining the proliferator objectives means increased proliferation
resistance. There is not, however, a quantitative correspondence between proliferator goals and
proliferation resistance values in this particular study.
The results of this methodology as it stands may still be qualitatively instructive. General
trends in the results, for example, might still be accurate. In addition, with further research, the
problem could be surmountable. First, experts in terrorism and proliferation should determine
proper threat categories (perhaps starting with the 7 categories specified in the NPAM report).
The proliferators' desired ranges for weapons yield and other parameters should be made explicit
and quantitative. Finally, utility functions should be constructed and weighted to output low
proliferation resistance values when material meets a proliferator's quantitative goals. There
would still be great uncertainty in this process, both in defining the threats and in modeling
different contributors to proliferation resistance. Quantitative results for proliferation resistance,
however, would have greater meaning.
2.3 Safeguards Context
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) works with NNSA, homeland
security, and intelligence agencies to safeguard nuclear facilities. Responsibilities of the NRC
include defining a "design basis threat" against which facilities must be protected, and
establishing guidelines for material control and accounting as well as physical protection of sites
and materials. For purposes of this assessment, we assume that each fuel cycle facility has
employed safeguards systems exactly equal to the minimum NRC requirements. [19] Though
specifics of these requirements are classified, fuel cycle facilities will have general safeguards in
place, described below. Some host nations, especially those which are developing, may not have
technology sophisticated as that employed in the U.S. This issue is addressed below; the initial
assumption is that basic NRC-required defense is available to any nuclear facility in the world.
The first line of defense for nuclear facilities includes controlled areas. Typically there is
an "exclusion area" outside the facility fences, controlled by the facility licensee. A "protected
area" is the next, closer to the plant, and bordered by fences with perimeter detection systems.
"Vital areas" are accessible only to personnel who pass criminal background checks. These are
bounded by doors with ID card or coded entries. Finally, "material access areas" allow only
those who pass more demanding background checks, and a "buddy system" prevents any worker
from entering alone. The perimeter of the protected area may have armed guards on duty for
surveillance, but for many facilities types, these guards are optional.
Perimeter security systems are designed to detect any intrusion through a planar area.
Three-dimensional detection is required in material access areas, where any disruption of the air
volume will trigger an alarm. In addition, security cameras may be required in sensitive
locations.
Nuclear facilities will also have response systems in place if an alarm is triggered. The
first line of defense will always be any on-site armed guards. Backup forces will also be warned
immediately, and should arrive several minutes after an alarm.
To summarize: for reference purposes of this study, the basic stationary nuclear facility
has the following safeguards in place (see Figure 2.1):
* exclusion area
* protected area
* vital area
* material access area (if needed)
* perimeter security (intrusion detection) at the protected area border
* volume security (motion detection) in material access areas
* security cameras at important portals
* some on-site, armed security staff (1-2 people at any time)
* backup security forces off-site
Figure 2.1 Map of nuclear security features for a nuclear power plant [20]
Particularly vulnerable facilities, or those that contained material easily fashioned into
nuclear weapons, should appear in this study as having low proliferation resistance. For those
locations, security measures could be increased. Facility managers might employ more cameras
and security guards, and armed perimeter forces. For extremely vulnerable sites, a licensee
might choose (or the NRC might require) establishment of a portal nuclear detector at the
entrance to the protected area. For this reason, the detectability of nuclear material is an
important factor to consider with proliferation resistance; though a facility might be especially
vulnerable, if the material present has a strong, easily detectable signal, proliferation resistance
might be increased dramatically with relative ease.
Transportation segments will also have basic safeguards. These include:
* armed escorts through populated areas
* protections for time-of-shipment information
* security features on the transport module (e.g. systems that will automatically "sit" the
back of a large truck down in an emergency, rendering the shipment impossible to move)
Other types of monitoring, such as GPS tracking of shipments, are also possible for
transportation segments.
Measures intended to protect sensitive material include a complex balance of intrinsic
(material) features and extrinsic safeguards like those described above. Though both types of
protection are important, "intrinsic" security features should be valued higher than extrinsic ones
for the following reasons.
As mentioned above, not all nations will have access to sophisticated protection
technology. In principle, however, a particularly vulnerable facility built in a low-technology
country could be outfitted by the U.S. or other nations with advanced technological safeguards.
The situation would be far from ideal, and the U.S. more likely would oppose siting of such
nuclear facilities in the first place. Yet if the U.S. or other advanced nations were to promote a
fuel cycle with sensitive processes and material, developing nations might wish to have facilities
of their own. The U.S. may not be able to stop them. Even if host nations use U.S.-made
safeguards equipment with their facilities, there is no guarantee that the equipment would be
used or maintained properly. Therefore, material and fuel cycles with unfavorable weapons
characteristics are safer than highly detectable material. Measures that increase material
detectability should be weighted less than those which render the material less useful in a nuclear
weapon.
As with the threat definition, this study does not quantitatively tie the safeguards context
and the metrics/weighting function. The trends exhibited should nevertheless be fairly accurate
and useful.
2.4 Fuel Cycle Segmentation
The United States currently practices the so-called "once-through" fuel cycle. This
means that uranium is mined, made into fuel, burned in a nuclear reactor, and then is destined for
geologic disposal. France, Japan, and Russia have some reprocessing capabilities: rather than
send their fuel immediately to disposal, they reprocess spent fuel and recycle it back into nuclear
reactors. The basic nuclear fuel cycle is illustrated below in its various segments (see Fig. 2.2),
and demonstrates two options for handling spent fuel.
Following is a brief discussion of each step in the general cycle, including notes on the
current and future status of technology at each segment. Those segments comprising the pre-
reactor steps are known as the "front-end" of the fuel cycle, while cooling, reprocessing, and
disposal segments are called the "back-end." The particular segmentation of the fuel cycle into
the steps below is common in nuclear studies, and similar divisions are used in MIT fuel cycle
simulations.
Nuclear
Reactor
Fuel
Figure Al
Nuclear Fuel Cycle
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*Spent Fuel Reprocessing is omitted from the cycle in
most countries, including the United States
Figure 2.2 Diagram of the basic nuclear fuel cycle[21]
Uranium Mining and Milling
All contemporary reactors rely heavily on uranium for fuel. Uranium is mined through
leach or strip-mining, and is found abundantly in Australia, Kazakhstan, Canada, and the U.S.
(the U.S. has 7% of known world uranium resources).[22] The global reactor fleet currently uses
about 66,500 tonnes of natural uranium per year. At this level of usage, the world's known
resources of 4.7 Mega-tonnes (Mt) are enough to last about 70 years. For the last twenty years or
so, however, very little uranium prospecting has been done. As nuclear power increases in
importance once again, the potential need for uranium has spurred intense mining activity in the
U.S. and around the world. Thus, more economically extractable resources may be found and
the known resources figure could increase by two or three times. Further increases are possible
if more expensive uranium sources are exploited. [23]
The available supply of natural uranium has an important impact on each nation's fuel
cycle choices. France, for example, has almost no uranium within its borders. As a matter of
national energy security, therefore, France has developed plutonium reprocessing capabilities.
Japan similarly is concerned about its resources for nuclear fuel, and so has recently completed
construction on a reprocessing facility. India has very little uranium, but abundant resources of
thorium make it particularly interested in thorium-fueled nuclear reactors.
Conversion and Enrichment
When uranium is extracted from the ground, it is 0.7% uranium-235; the remainder us
uranium-238. In order to sustain a chain reaction in the core of a nuclear reactor for a period of
one to two years, the fuel needs to be enriched so that the uranium-235 content is 3.5-5%.
The uranium is first converted into uranium-hexafluoride gas. It then goes to an
enrichment plant, where the U-235 ratio is increased by either the use of a gaseous diffusion or
gaseous centrifuge process. Gaseous diffusion is the older technology. It is slightly more
expensive than centrifuging, but is the only type of enrichment practiced in the U.S. Centrifuges
are relatively newer, cheaper, and, some argue, easier to use for fabrication of weapons-grade
uranium. Rearranging centrifuge cascades allows a user to enrich uranium to 90% U-235, far
above the 5% needed in power reactors. A simple gun-type nuclear weapon can be made with
90% U-235.
Different fuel cycle strategies make different demands on reprocessing facilities. For
example, certain types of reactor/cycle arrangements may require uranium enriched to 8% or
even 12% in order to sustain chain reactions in the presence of certain other metals.
Fuel Fabrication
The fuel fabrication step is delicate: each reactor type has very important specifications
for its fuel. Many of the reactors in the U.S. require their own, unique types of fuel assemblies,
and there are generally only a few manufacturers in the world that can make fuel for a given
plant.[24] The exact enrichment, height, spacing and design of the fuel rods and assemblies are
very important for the reactor core neutronics.
Fuel fabrication could be complex for some advanced fuel cycles. Currently, fabrication
facilities mostly process the low-enriched uranium required for standard light water reactors
(LWRs). Extensive reprocessing, especially if it involves recycling of the minor actinides, could
require fabrication facilities to handle highly radioactive materials. Hot cells and remote-
processing will contribute significantly to the cost and proliferation resistance profiles of such
fuel cycles.
Nuclear Reactors
About 60% reactors in the world are of the LWR class, and are either boiling-water
reactors (BWRs) or pressurized-water reactors (PWRs). Reactors operate by producing heat,
which comes from the energy released in nuclear fission reactions. The heat is transferred to
steam which turns a turbine and produces electricity. Inside the reactor core is a hot, highly
radioactive environment, and a reactor in operation is not considered a proliferation concern
because of the danger posed to humans.
The first generation of nuclear reactors includes those built during the time of the
Manhattan project. Some reactors were used to produce plutonium, while others served as the
first demonstration/prototype plants for electricity production. Generation II reactors were built
for about two decades starting in the mid-1970s. The LWRs currently used in the U.S. are
generation II reactors. Generation III and III+ reactors are emerging now. The European Power
Reactor (EPR) developed by AREVA is one such reactor; an EPR is under construction in
Finland. Generation III and III+ reactors offer enhancements in safety and economics, and new
plants awaiting license approval in the U.S. for near-term construction are of Generation III.
Generation IV power reactors represent even further advances in technology, and will be able to
consume some of the waste generated by traditional LWRs. Six different concept reactors are
under development by members of the Generation IV International Forum.[25]
The reactor is the center of the fuel cycle. The reactor design will directly dictate the
specifications for all other fuel cycle facilities; fabricated fuel will need to be of a certain
composition, and the constituents and qualities of the spent fuel will depend entirely on the
reactor environment.
Cooling Pools
Each reactor is built with an on-site cooling pool. In many new reactor designs, there are
complex connections between the reactor core and the pool, such that fuel assemblies can be
transferred to the pool without being exposed to air. In general, all spent nuclear fuel must spend
5 or more years cooling before it can be handled at all; the radiation and heat from fresh spent
fuel is immense.
In the United States, some spent fuel cooling pools are full. Reactors have been in
operation for 40 years or more, and utilities originally thought that spent fuel would go to
Department of Energy (DOE)-operated repositories by 1998. Nuclear plant operators are still
waiting for DOE, and some have been forced to move their oldest spent fuel into large casks for
dry storage above ground. These casks are a form of interim storage.
New power plants include plans for larger cooling pools in order to avoid using
expensive, dry casks. In all other respects, cooling pools for new power plants will be very
similar to those in use: they will include cameras and safeguards equipment, and will be co-
located with reactors.
Interim Storage
Because the U.S. government has been slow to implement a plan for spent nuclear fuel,
some politicians and scientists have suggested that the U.S. build one or several interim storage
facilities. The idea is that DOE would take title to the fuel and move it to central locations for
dry, temporary storage. Eventually, the fuel would either be reprocessed or would go to a
geologic repository.
Establishing an interim storage program, however, may be politically infeasible. Nothing
provokes a "not-in-my-backyard" response so strongly as a plan to put spent nuclear fuel near
population centers. Residents fear that interim repositories will become permanent as the
political fight to establish Yucca Mountain rages on.
Nevertheless, many of the advanced fuel cycle strategies will require some form of
interim storage. Spent fuel will be moved from reactor sites, but must be kept accessible for
potential use in advanced reactors with recycling capabilities. It is not likely that all spent fuel
will move immediately from reactors to reprocessing facilities and then to reactors again. Rather,
some fuel will be used at once, while other fuel might be left to cool in dry storage for some
time; this would create a complex isotopic balance that might be beneficial for some fuel cycle
strategies.
Reprocessing
The Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by EXtraction (PUREX) process was originally
developed to separate weapons-usable plutonium from lightly-burned nuclear fuel. All
reprocessing plants in the world that recycle civilian spent fuel use this same process, extracting
plutonium for use in Mixed-Oxide (MOX) fuel. MOX fuel is loaded into slightly modified
LWRs, and current practice in France is to burn MOX fuel once and then to designate it for
disposal. In sum, the process amounts to a "twice-through" cycle where plutonium is stripped
from spent fuel, sent back to reactors, and then discarded after its second use.
Reprocessing is attractive to countries that wish to make maximum use of their nuclear
fuel. For standard residence times in nuclear reactors, only a small amount of the energy present
in the initial UO 2 fuel is used. Reprocessing allows extraction of greater amounts of energy, but
current techniques (only PUREX is commercialized at this time) are relatively expensive.[26]
Advanced reprocessing techniques are of worldwide interest, and are now becoming
important to the U.S. The U.S. has so far put its greatest effort into developing what is called the
URanium EXtraction (UREX) process. UREX separates out uranium, but leaves plutonium
mixed with other actinides and fission products. Fission products are ultimately stripped as well.
The plutonium+actinide mix can then be burned in fast reactors, and the resulting waste
(depending on the TRU conversion ratio) contains fewer long-lived isotopes than does waste
from a traditional LWR. UREX holds the promise of reducing the waste burden on a geologic
repository, increasing the amount of energy extracted from a given amount of fuel, and
potentially decreasing the risk of proliferation by keeping plutonium mixed with other
radioactive elements.[27] Other types of reprocessing, including pyroprocessing and other
aqueous methods, are still in the early stages of development.
Repository (Permanent Storage)
Some sort of permanent, ultimate disposal is needed for any fuel cycle option. It is not
possible to eliminate the nuclear waste burden with reactors and reprocessing alone. There will
be residual effluents or "tails" from each stage of the cycle that will need disposing, and there are
also isotopes produced in nuclear reactors that are radioactive and hot but not possible to recycle.
Geological storage has long been considered the best option to isolate nuclear spent fuel
and other byproducts from the environment and from people.[28] Whether sites exist at Yucca
Mountain, Olkiluoto in Finland, or elsewhere, the world will need several repositories to handle
existing and future waste.
2.5 Proliferation Resistance Metrics and Utility Functions
In order to assess proliferation resistance, previous studies have used varying numbers of
nuclear material attributes. These attributes include things like the radioactivity of nuclear
material, the enrichment, etc. Often, such "low-level" or directly measurable material
characteristics are related to higher-level metrics, such as "material quality." For this study,
eleven metrics were chosen to represent low-level attributes that are important to proliferation
resistance. These metrics were selected, as much as possible, for completeness, ease of
understanding, and adaptability to a computer program. A secondary consideration was the
independence of the metrics; this was not wholly achieved with the present set. Once chosen, the
metrics were aggregated into groups for the purpose of weighting (see Figure 2.3).
The utility functions are heavily based on the work of W. Charlton.[29] The reason for
this is simply that Charlton published these functions, and time did not permit a complete
restructuring of each one according to expert input. A more rigorous method could be created by
eliciting expert opinion on the metrics to be used, as well as on how to structure the utility and
weighting functions.
Figure 2.3 Proliferation Safeguarding Success Tree (Safeguarder Point of View)
High-Level Metrics
Figure 2.3 shows all eleven metrics, organized into three groups. The first group is
"material characteristics," or properties of the nuclear material that make it more or less useful
for building a weapon. The second category, "material characteristics for acquisition or
handling," contains attributes related to the ease of stealing and moving the material. The final
category is "facility characteristics." As mentioned before, specific facility plans are not
available for the advanced systems to be assessed. The three low-level metrics are those which
are known at the initial stages of fuel cycle development, and which cannot change unless the
fuel concept changes entirely.
Low-Level Metrics and Utility Functions
Eight of the eleven metrics are associated directly with a measurable property of the
nuclear material. For these characteristics, a number such as the "decay power in watts" of the
nuclear material is calculated, and then used as input to a utility function. The utility function
outputs a value of proliferation resistance between zero and one, zero being least proliferation
resistant (and most attractive to a proliferator) and one being most proliferation resistant (and
most attractive to a safeguarder). The utility value is related to the input quantity according to a
specific function. These functions are discussed in detail below.
The three remaining metrics, separability, transport type, and continuous vs. bulk
processing, are not directly measurable. For these properties, a qualitative constructed scale
determines their contribution to proliferation resistance. The separability scale has five levels;
the other two scales are binary functions. The meanings of high utility values for each of the
metrics are summarized below in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Metrics Summary
Metric Meaning of High Utility Value
Decay Power from Pu Low likelihood of weapon detonation success
Spontaneous Fission Rate Low likelihood of weapon detonation success
Concentration More mass must be stolen to achieve weapon capability - this can
mean greater expenditure on transport equipment and/or greater
time to divert from a continuous process
Separability of Fissionable More time/money resources needed extract material for weapon
Material
Radioactivity Low likelihood of successful material handling and processing
Facility Type Low likelihood of attack success due to better safeguarding options
at stationary facilities
Bulk v. Continuous The mass diverted will be noticed more easily (if the process is bulk
rather than continuous)
Detectability A proliferator will need to spend more money on shielding
technologies to avoid potential detection (esp. by portal detectors)
Throughput Fewer opportunities for diversion and/or less time needed to steal
small quantities
Enrichment Uranium is of low enrichment, and therefore will require more
material/resources to fashion into a weapon
Mass and Bulk More resources are needed to move the desired object and evade
detection
Decay Heat (Power)
The first metric takes the decay heat of plutonium as input to its utility function. In
general, even isotopes of plutonium produce more heat than do the odd isotopes. G. Kessler
noted that plutonium with a composition comprised of 60% even-Pu isotopes or greater,
proliferators with low technological capability would have great difficulty detonating a
plutonium-based weapon[30]. With greater technical know-how, however, such an actor might
be able to properly ventilate the weapon structure so that the casing would not melt. Kessler
concluded that nuclear explosive devices with sufficiently high decay heat are considered
"denatured," or completely unusable as nuclear weapons; the utility function for this property is
thus extremely conservative.
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Figure 2.4 Utility Graph of Decay Heat Metric, according to W. Charlton[11]
Figure 2.4 shows the graph of decay heat utility vs. the heating rate of plutonium in watts.
The equation for the function is:
0.8
u(x,)= 1-exp -3 x(1)( max
where ul(xi) is the proliferation resistance utility of decay heat, x1 is the heat rate of the
plutonium in the material, and Xmax is the maximum heat rate of plutonium (considered to be 570
W/kgPu, or the heat rate of pure Pu-238). If the amount of plutonium in the material is identical
to zero, the utility value is set to one. This reflects the fact that the best contribution to
proliferation resistance by plutonium comes from eliminating the material altogether.
The decay heat utility function is taken directly from Charlton's work on fuel assembly
proliferation resistance. In general, as decay heat increases, the proliferation resistance utility
also increases. The particular shape of the function ensures that for higher heat rates, the same
increase in heat corresponds to a smaller increase in proliferation resistance than for lower values.
Spontaneous Fission
The second metric considers the proliferation resistance contribution of a material's
spontaneous fission rate. Here, again, plutonium is the major player. As the ratio of even
isotopes in the plutonium increases, so too does the rate of spontaneous fission. With more
spontaneous fission, more neutrons are emitted which could pre-initiate the nuclear chain
reaction; early initiation of the reaction causes weapons to have a low or "fizzle" yield.
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Figure 2.5 Graph of Spontaneous Fission Utility Function
(adapted from W. Charlton with assistance from LLNL [29])
Figure 2.5 shows the graph of the utility of a material spontaneous fission rate, expressed
as the weight fraction of even to all plutonium isotopes. The graph equation (designed finally by
the author) is:
U(x 2) =
1 (1- exp[- 3.5(x 2)'-8, 0< x 2 < 0.62
e(6 x2- 4 .8) + 0.07, 0.6 < x 2 < 0.8 (2)
1, otherwise
where u(x2) is the utility of spontaneous fission, and x2 is the weight fraction of even Pu isotopes
to all Pu isotopes. The weight fraction of Pu isotopes is used as a proxy for spontaneous fission
rate mainly because Charlton's utility function took it as an input. Perhaps a better utility
function could be made by using the spontaneous fission rate directly.
The y-axis of the graph, showing "utility of spontaneous fission," essentially measures
the contribution of the spontaneous fission rate to material protection. Higher utility values
mean that the spontaneous fission rate is high and aids in preventing the proliferator from
successfully deploying a weapon. U(x) is defined the same way as in Charlton's analysis. The
utilities represent the mapping of various material quantities onto a linear spectrum, where 0
means the property contributes very little to proliferation resistance, and 1 means that it
contributes very heavily.
As above, if there is no plutonium present, the utility value is set to one. Although a
uranium weapon may still produce a fizzle yield due to spontaneous fission, the technical
obstacles are much lower for a high-yield uranium bomb than for a high-yield plutonium bomb.
Setting the value to one (highest proliferation resistance) for the zero-plutonium case emphasizes
the resistance value of eliminating plutonium, and allows the "enrichment" metric to be the
primary discriminator of uranium material quality.
This utility function was adapted from W. Charlton's work, with the help of various
members of the Lawrence Livermore National Lab division of nonproliferation.[31] As with
decay heat, the utility of spontaneous fission increases with increasing even plutonium isotopes
and increasing spontaneous fission rate. Unlike that of decay heat, however, spontaneous fission
utility becomes even more important for high input values. Once the plutonium in the material
includes 80% even isotopes, according to experts at LLNL,[31 ] it will be essentially impossible
to use the plutonium to make a nuclear weapon.
A note on metric independence: the reader will observe that spontaneous fission and
decay heat are strongly related. Both depend entirely on the fraction of even isotopes present in
plutonium. Some might argue that this is to be avoided because it is "double-counting" the even-
isotope property of the material. In this specific case, however, the percentage of even isotopes
contributes to two distinct technological issues. A proliferator would have to overcome
problems with decay heat AND spontaneous fission. In a sense, it can be said that the ratio of
even plutonium isotopes is doubly as important as some other measurements in determining the
proliferation resistance of the nuclear material. Several studies (e.g. Charlton,[ 11] TOPS[9]) use
each attribute as a separate metric, despite the apparent dependency.
Concentration
The third metric aims to account for the concentration of nuclear material. To do so, the
function utilizes the concept of "significant quantity." A significant quantity (SQ) of material is
defined by the IAEA to be the amount needed to make a single nuclear weapon. These values
are: 8 kg of plutonium, 25 kg of highly-enriched uranium (enriched to above 20% U-235), 8 kg
of uranium-233, 75 kg of low-enriched uranium (enriched to 15% U-235), and 25 kg of
neptunium-237.[32]
With more significant quantities of plutonium, uranium, or neptunium present per
MTHM, a proliferator would have to expend fewer resources diverting and/or moving the
material needed for a bomb. The utility value is thus one measure of the likelihood that a
proliferator will evade detection systems in diverting the material. If the target material has a
low concentration of SQs, then the proliferator will require more time or more (potentially
visible) people or theft attempts to acquire it. As the concentration increases, the likelihood that
the proliferator will be caught decreases. The input to the utility function is therefore the number
of significant quantities of material per MTHM on average at the particular segment.
Figure 2.6 Graph of Utility of Material Concentration
Like the utility function for decay heat, that for concentration (Fig. 2.6) is taken directly
from the work of W. Charlton. The equation for the concentration utility function (defined
largely by the author) is:
1, x3 <0.01
2,0x 03,max .01
where u3(x 3) is the utility of the concentration of material, x3 is the number of significant
quantities of uranium, plutonium, or neptunium per MTHM, and xm~ is the "maximum
concentration" of material. This maximum is defined as 94 SQs/MT, or about the concentration
of so-called "super-grade" plutonium.
The graph is a decreasing exponential. As the concentration increases, the utility of
concentration for proliferation resistance also decreases. The drop is more precipitous for low
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values of concentration, indicating that small increases in concentration at those levels have a
greater impact on the decrease in proliferation resistance.
Separability
A proliferator will have an easier time building a nuclear weapon if the nuclear material
of interest is separated from other elements. Material diverted from a civilian fuel cycle will
likely need some further chemical processing; while easier to perform than enrichment, such
processing will require some resources and know-how.
The proliferator will need some specialized equipment to perform the separation, and in
general has two options: (1) take over an already-built reprocessing facility, utilizing its
equipment and separations materials, or (2) build a new facility. (Host nations have a third
option, which is to reprocess materials in their own facilities covertly, without detection by the
IAEA. This option is discussed further below.) The first option is highly implausible. A hostile
attack and takeover of a reprocessing plant would require an extremely large amount of people,
resources, and tactical ingenuity. It could not be done covertly, and would certainly invite
worldwide condemnation and powerful counterattacks. Construction of a new facility, however,
could be done clandestinely.
The relative capital costs of chemical processing equipment are outlined below in Table
2.3. Not shown are costs related to environmental protection; if a subnational or nation-state
were concerned about pollution, they could add protective equipment at an additional cost. If
more processing steps were required for a particular material, the cost of environmental
protection would likely scale somewhat with the cost of additional basic processing equipment.
For this reason, including environmental equipment in the analysis would probably not have a
significant impact on the final utility scale for separability.
The total cost of a reprocessing plant in 1983 dollars is about $1.5-2.4 billion dollars, for
a processing rate of about 1500 MTHM/yr. [33] In order to process fuel from fast reactors, the
costs of building and operating a plant would likely increase substantially.[34]
Relative Equipment Costs for Chemical Processing (Haire, ORNL[33])Table
In addition to equipment capital costs, a proliferator would have to purchase chemicals
(some of which are consumable) in order to process nuclear material. The approximate cost
ratios for various chemicals important to plutonium reprocessing are outlined below in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Cost Factors for Reprocessing Chemicals
Chemical Cost Factor References
Sodium Hydroxide 1 [35]
Sodium Nitrate 3.5x(Sodium Hydroxide) [35]
Tributyl Phosphate (TBP) 110x(Sodium Nitrate) [36]
Stolen material will have a specific chemical form, dependent on the fuel cycle segment
from which it was stolen. If the proliferator steals spent fuel, he will have to conduct all
reprocessing steps to obtain pure nuclear materials for a weapon. On the other hand, if he diverts
solid uranium or plutonium in fairly pure form (virtually never present in typical fuel cycles), he
will not have to do any processing at all. The separability scale divides material into five
chemical forms, each requiring a different number of processing steps:
1. Spent fuel with many different chemical constituents (e.g., from a spent fuel pool)
- requiring all steps, from mechanical feed preparation to fissile conversion
2. Solid fuel without structural materials (e.g., from a fabrication plant)
- requires some steps: feed prep, off-gas, U extraction, Pu extraction, fissile
conversion
3. Mixed Pu solution (e.g., at the beginning of a reprocessing cycle)
- requires some steps: U extraction, Pu extraction, fissile conversion
Process % Capital Cost for Equipment
Mechanical Feed Preparation 13%
Tritium Confinement 3.65%
Dissolution 8.16%
Feed Preparation 0.69%
Off-Gassing 5.39%
Solvent Extraction (U) 1.39%
Solvent Extraction (Pu) 1.56%
LEU Purification and Conversion 4.68%
Fissile Conversion 2.26%
2.3
4. Separated Pu solution (e.g., at the midpoint of a reprocessing cycle)
- need only to precipitate Pu from TBP: fissile conversion
5. Pu/HEU metal solid (not found in typical fuel cycles)
- no processing needed
With the process requirements defined as above, a constructed scale is made according to the
cost of the needed equipment and chemicals. All numbers are normalized to a utility value of 1
for the first scenario, where the proliferator has to complete all chemical processing from the
start. The Pu/HEU metal solid material is assigned a utility value of zero for separability. The
estimations and the resulting constructed scale are given in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 Constructed Scale for Separability Utility
Material Percentage of total Chemicals Chemical Factor: Proliferation
reprocessing plant needed to calculated Resistance
capital costs process material according to Utility Value
required to process chemical
material[33] costs[35],[36]
Solid fuel + 32.45 TBP, Nitric Acid, 32.45+110+3.5*2 1
structure Sodium +1+1 = 151.45
Hydroxide, PE
Solid fuel w/o 11.29 TBP, Nitric Acid, 11.29+110 +3.5+1 0.83
structure PE = 125.79
Mixed Pu 5.21 1/2 TBP, Nitric 5.21+55+3.5+1 = 0.43
solution Acid, PE 64.71
Separated 2.26 Precipitation 2.26+1 = 3.36 0.02
Pu/HEU solution equipment (PE)
Pu/HEU solid 0 none 0 0
The scale is used by first determining the average material form in a fuel cycle segment,
and then assigning the associated separability utility value. The reader will observe that the scale
is HIGHLY approximate. In reality, the actual costs of equipment and chemicals may vary
widely; they might change significantly with time and technological improvement, and will
depend on location and specificity of use (i.e. materials usable only in nuclear operations will be
harder to obtain). Particularly intelligent proliferators may also determine ways of performing
some processing steps in a cheaper, more ad-hoc manner than that used in commercial
reprocessing facilities. Finally, mistakes and technological difficulties, including a radiation
barrier, will add additional costs that are not accounted for here.
Radioactivity
Highly radioactive material will pose a significant difficulty to proliferators. Subnational
or host state actors would have to either invest in shielding equipment, or risk injury or
incapacitation. Some terrorists might be suicidal, and so would focus only on radiation levels
high enough to prevent them from carrying out their tasks; they would not be bothered by lethal
radiation doses as long as they were able to work for needed amounts of time. The radioactivity
metric accounts for the difficulties posed by the material's radiation barrier. The utility function
is shown in Fig. 2.7.
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Figure 2.7 Graph of Utility of Radiation Dose Rate
The radioactivity metric is adapted from the work of W. Charlton[ 11] with comments
from the LLNL nonproliferation division and the MIT fuel cycle group. The equation for the
radioactivity utility function is:
ln(x 5 + 1)u(x,) = (3)9.2
where u(x5) is the utility of radiation for proliferation resistance, and x5 is the radioactive dose
rate concentration in rem/hr/SQ for unshielded material.
In his report, Charlton put the maximum value of proliferation resistance utility at a dose
rate concentration of 600 rem/hr/SQ.[11] Beyond that, he assumed, death is certain in all cases.
His work, however, only considered the actions of a host nation, and did not assume any suicidal
actors. To broaden the possible threat spectrum, this work sets the maximum dose rate at 10,000
rem/hr/SQ. At this dose rate, a person would receive a 1000-rem dose every six minutes. The
proliferator would begin to see cognitive effects and a depression of physical abilities at the very
first six-minute mark. By 30 minutes, many humans would be completely incapacitated, and by
1 hour, nearly all humans would be incapacitated. Even very short exposures to material at this
radiation level would result in sure death within a few weeks.[37] Under these circumstances,
handling the material would be nearly impossible, so the proliferation resistance utility is set to
one.
Identical to Charlton's model, the radiation source is assumed to be a line source in air
with photons impinging on a 70 kg man. The line source model may be accurate for fuel
assemblies and for material in an aqueous stream through certain types of reprocessing
equipment. Future studies are needed to determine whether the utility values are highly sensitive
to these assumptions.
Facility Type
Even before detailed facility design information is available, some observations can be
made about the structure of an advanced fuel cycle. Advanced nuclear reactors will likely be
built at sites all over the country. Reprocessing facilities, however, will benefit from economies
of scale and will probably be fewer in number. For this reason, a transportation step to move
fuel between reactor discharge and fuel reprocessing will almost certainly be needed. The
"facility type" metric seeks only to distinguish between transportation and stationary segments.
A qualitative scale has been constructed to represent the utility of transportation segments
vs. stationary segments (see Table 2.6).
Table 2.6 Utility Table for Facility Type
Segment Type Transportation Stationary
Utility Value 0.0 0.8
The scale was constructed subjectively for our work. Originally, transportation segments
were given a value of 0.0 and stationary segments a value of 1. The stationary segment utility
value was decreased to 0.8 after review by several members of the DOE Office of Nuclear
Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).[38] The slightly lower
utility value reflects the fact that stationary facilities tend to have routinized procedures, and
these routines may help the insider determine the best way to divert material.
Batch vs. Item
Like the utility function for Facility Type, the Batch vs. Item function has a simple binary
form. For material accounting purposes, it is easier to keep track of certain types of items that
can be individually counted. Material processed in batch or continuous form, and requiring
special measuring devices for accounting, is more difficult to protect from material diversion. In
principle, a proliferator could divert very small quantities of material from a batch process, and
still could leave the material amounts high enough to be within the range of measurement error.
Such tactics would be difficult if highly modem measurement tools were used in conjunction
with other safeguards, but batch processes are still generally more vulnerable because
safeguarders would likely require more time to discover a material imbalance.
Table 2.7 Utility Table for Batch vs. Item
Process Type Item Batch
Utility Value 1 0
This utility scale was constructed by the author with assistance from the MIT fuel cycle
group, and is given in Table 2.7.
Detectability
A material with strong photon and neutron signals is easier to detect than one with weak
emissions. In fact, scientists have suggested that "doping" nuclear materials with neptunium
could increase proliferation resistance, by providing a strong and easily detectable photon signal.
Though a proliferator could separate out the strong-signal isotopes, he would probably first need
to smuggle the material out of a safeguarded facility. Reference specifications for detectability
of nuclear material are shown below in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8 Reference Assumptions for the Detectability Metric
The material has certain rates of photon and neutron emissions, to be calculated by
software for the particular isotopic vector at a given segment. We assume that the proliferator
has access to a truck and to a simple box with 1" lead shielding. We further assume a portal
detector with detection panels sized to a 1 meter distance on either side of the truck, and an
optimal detection range of 100-1000 counts/second. The reference detector is a plastic
scintillator, which detects raw counts rather than spectral information. Integration time is 1
minute.
Using the assumption that detector efficiency generally increases with the count rate, Prof.
Dwight Williams of MIT and this author developed a logarithmic utility function for
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detectability.[39] In this way, greater photon or neutron counts contribute to a higher utility of
proliferation resistance for detectability. The utility function is shown in Fig. 2.9.
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Figure 2.9 Graph of Detectability Utility
The equation for the detectability utility function is:
In(x8 +1)
55.5
(4)
where u(x8) is the utility of detectability for proliferation resistance, and x8 is the number of
photons or neutrons emitted per second per MTHM by the material in a given segment.
The assumption that detector efficiency (and thus detectability utility) increases
logarithmically with photon or neutron counts is unproven; it represents an estimate made
somewhat arbitrarily by the author and Dr. Williams. Further studies should evaluate how a
change in function shape (e.g. to a square root or decreasing exponential) affects both the utility
values and the overall calculation of proliferation resistance.
0
Segment Throughput
Facilities or segments with high material throughputs provide more opportunities to
divert material. If a proliferator works by diverting small quantities over time, high throughputs
will decrease the amount of time he needs to acquire a significant quantity. Although these
proliferation resistance characteristics are related to the concentration of the material, segment
throughput is a separate metric because it concerns total volumes. For this utility function,
inputs are given in units per MWt of power generated; these input units are summarized below in
Table 2.8.
Table 2.8 Units of Input for the Throughput Utility Function
Segment Type Throughput Function Input
Fabrication or Enrichment Facility Mass processed/MWt
Transportation Mass transported/MWt
Reprocessing Facility Mass reprocessed/MWt
Interim Repository Net mass moved (removed or added)/MWt
Permanent (Geologic) Storage Waste added to repository/MWt
Utility of Throughput
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Figure 2.10 Graph of Throughput Utility
The utility of material throughput is expressed as a decreasing exponential (Figure 2.10);
it represents an estimation by the author. The equation is:
-Xs
u9 (x9) = exp - (5)109000
Where u9 (x9) is the proliferation resistance utility of segment throughput, and x9 is the function
input in kg of material processed per MWt generated power per year. The function is shown in
Fig. 2.10.
If there is no material processed at a facility, the proliferation resistance is one. If more
than 10,000 kg of material are processed per MWt in the system per year, the proliferation
resistance is set to zero. We assume that at this very high rate of processing, a proliferator will
have ample diversion opportunities and proliferation resistance cannot decrease further, even if
the throughput becomes greater. The exponential shape reflects the fact that small increases in
throughput have large effects on proliferation resistance for low throughput values, and these
throughput changes become less important as facilities and processing rates become larger.
Mass and Bulk
The proliferation resistance utility ascribed to material for its mass and bulk depends on
the process type. If the process type is "continuous," the utility value is set to zero. This is
because for material removed from a continuous, and likely aqueous process, the proliferator can
decide how massive and bulky to make each material unit. The most likely scenario for facilities
with continuous processing is that a proliferator would divert small amounts at a time (preferably
within accounting errors), and that the primary measure of proliferation resistance would be the
time needed to gather a significant quantity. This is assessed with the "Throughput" metric.
If, on the other hand, the desired material is in item form, the weight and size of a
material unit affect the proliferator's ability to divert the object. In order to move a particular
unit, the proliferator has essentially four options: (1) hand-carry the object, (2) carry the object
on a hand truck or dolly, (3) use a forklift to move the object, or (4) use a crane to move the
object. As the object increases in mass, the challenge of moving the object also increases. It
does not increase smoothly, however; there will be sharp increases in difficulty when the
proliferator has to use larger pieces of equipment. Using a crane, for example, would be highly
undesirable for the proliferator, because any crane operation within a nuclear facility would be
easy to detect.
The utility function shape tries to approximate the increase in difficulty according to the
particular equipment required. Each equipment type is usable, on average, for a specific range of
masses. The upper and lower bounds are taken from an English lifting guide, and are used as the
endpoints for linear functions.[40] The utility graph is shown in Figure 2.11. For purposes of
this research, the endpoints are connected to create a continuous function. In practice, there
would be a step up each time a larger tool was needed; the size of the step would be proportional
to the increase in difficulty of using the tool without detection by safeguards. Further research
could establish proper estimations of the step size.
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Figure 2.11 Graph of Utility of Mass and Bulk for Item Objects
The utility function for mass/bulk takes the object mass in kg as an input. Once a
proliferation resistance utility is assigned to the object, based on its mass as prescribed by the
function, the utility value is adjusted according to object bulkiness. Adjustments are made as
follows:
* If the object can be carried by hand or dolly, the utility value remains the same. This
assumes that extra bulkiness can be compensated relatively easily with extra people or
extra dollies.
* If the object must be carried by forklift or crane, extra bulkiness will move the utility
value up one category. The final proliferation resistance utility will be the lowest value
in the next-highest mass category.
The equation for the proliferation resistance utility of object mass is:
SR
0.004 * x10, 0 <x 0 < 100
(4.08x10-')*x 1O +0.396, 100< xio0  5000 (6)
U10(X0) (6x10-5)* xo, 5000< x 10  10000
(1 x10 -5 )* X0 +0.8, 10000 < x •o 0 20000
where u0o(xI0) is the proliferation resistance utility according to mass and bulk (without the bulk
adjustment), and xio is the mass of the object in kg. Above a mass of 20,000kg, the mass would
require a category III crane. Category III cranes are assumed to be too expensive and obvious
for actual use in a proliferation attempt, especially because smaller units of nuclear material are
easily found.
Uranium Enrichment
The higher the enrichment of uranium, the greater is the probability of constructing a
successful nuclear weapon. The IAEA defines any uranium enriched to above 20% uranium-235
to be "highly-enriched uranium" (HEU). The handling and material accounting requirements are
significantly different for HEU than for LEU constituting less than 20% U-235. The distinction
is somewhat arbitrary. Ease of bomb-making increases on a continuum as the enrichment level
increases, and there is virtually no difference in the difficulty of creating a nuclear bomb with
19.999% U-235 vs. creating one with 20.001% U-235. Building a bomb at these enrichment
levels, however, would be extremely difficult. Uranium enriched to 20% U-235 has a critical
mass of about 400kg, and then only if the bomb-maker uses technologically tricky reflectors and
other devices to enhance the yield. At an enrichment of 15% , the critical mass skyrockets to
well over 1000kg.[41] In general, proliferators desire uranium with enrichments close to 90%,
so that the critical mass will be on the order of 50kg.
We assume (see §2.2) that neither proliferator has the ability to perform uranium
enrichment with diverted material. Nowhere in any currently-imagined fuel cycle is uranium
enriched to levels near 90% or weapons-grade. For this reason, uranium material in a fuel cycle
should be relatively unattractive to the low-technology proliferation threat. More advanced
proliferators with access to enrichment facilities might find 5-12% enriched uranium very
attractive; with initial enrichment completed, the uranium could be fed into centrifuges for rapid
production of weapons-grade material. Such cases are not considered here.
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Figure 2.12 Graph of Uranium Enrichment Utility
The uranium utility function was derived by the author, and is given in Fig. 2.12. The
proliferation resistance utility decreases only gradually for low enrichment levels, but is less than
one for all non-zero enrichments. As the enrichment increases, the proliferation resistance utility
drops more quickly. This indicates that the worst proliferation risks involve highly-enriched
uranium.
The utility function equation for uranium enrichment is:
, I(X ) = 2 - exp[0.000069* (x )2] (7)
where ul l(x ll) is the utility of proliferation resistance due to uranium enrichment, and x l is the
percent enrichment of uranium-235.
Limitations of the Metrics
One problem with this approach is that the utility functions are insensitive to threat type;
the forms and shapes do not change depending on the threat type. This may not accurately
reflect the actions of the individual actors. For example, the shape of the radioactivity function
might be different for a host state vs. subnational. A host state would struggle with radiation,
and increased doses would gradually increase the proliferation resistance utility. At some point,
however, the increase in proliferation resistance utility might level off, because the host nation
could possess proper shielding and remote handling equipment. A host nation with such tools
would not be restricted by radioactivity, and proliferation resistance utility would not increase,
until extremely high levels of radiation overwhelmed the shielding. By contrast, a subnational
would have a much more difficult time gaining sophisticated equipment for handling
radioactivity. For this reason, the utility curve for a subnational would never flatten; it would
increase steadily, combated only by using greater numbers of suicidal terrorists to handle
particularly hazardous material.
The weights do differ for subnationals and host nations (see below in section 2.6), so
some differences in preferences and abilities are reflected by this methodology. A truly rigorous
framework, however, would develop utility functions independently for each threat type. Indeed,
a modified choice of metrics might even be appropriate to fully model the proliferation resistance
in the face of different threats.
Metrics Not Used in This Study
Several other proliferation resistance metrics are common to other studies, but were not
used here. Two significant ones are proliferation time and proliferation cost (or, alternatively,
proliferation resources). Time is not used as an independent metric; rather, the proliferation
resistance values calculated with the above framework are plotted against time. In this way, the
decision-maker or analyst could quickly see how time affects vulnerability. He or she would
presumably worry most about low proliferation resistance values that last for multiple timesteps,
because they would afford the most opportunities for diverting material.
The proliferation cost is analogous to the safeguarding cost. If more resources are needed
for the proliferator to successfully accomplish his task, the safeguarder will require fewer
resources to protect the nuclear material. Both of these numbers are reflected by the proliferation
resistance utilities. In general, an increase in proliferation resistance utility corresponds to an
increase in the costs facing a proliferator.
Conspicuously absent is a metric accounting for the total mass available in a given
segment. Of course, if no material is available at any point, that point should have perfect
proliferation resistance. Other studies, including Charlton's, use the mass at each segment as a
final weighting factor. In this way, the mass, in a sense, has ultimate say in the final proliferation
resistance value. If many SQs exist in one facility, that facility will get a low proliferation
resistance rating. Many studies scale proliferation resistance linearly with increases in mass,
meaning that a facility with 100 SQs is 10 times as vulnerable and problematic as one with 10
SQs. This may not actually be the case; if a proliferator possesses even one SQ of material, the
results could be devastating.
In this study, a utility function characterizing the proliferation resistance associated with
mass values was finally discarded. The reason is that, in many cases, the available mass could
actually be adjusted if sheer volume were a problem. Fuel cycle facilities try to leverage
economies of scale by building large capacities and keeping capacity factors high. If such
facilities posed severe proliferation risks, however, the amount of available mass could be
lowered at some finite cost equal to sacrificing the scale economy. Furthermore, the
"throughput" metric accounts to some extent for the masses present in a facility; it does so while
including information about the residence time of material in the segment.
Even if a metric intended to account for available mass were included, it would probably
not have a significant effect on the results. The reason is that total material amounts at fuel cycle
segments are generally very high. Only one significant quantity is needed to produce a bomb;
once the amount of material reaches 5 or more significant quantities, there would not be any
significant change in the utility if more mass were added. While it is certainly worse for a
proliferator to possess 10 bombs than one bomb, the relationship is not linear. There is only a
relatively small difference between a proliferator detonating five bombs or ten, because though
the economic and life-loss damage would be twice as high, the shock and galvanization of the
world would likely be similar for both cases. Calculating utility values for very high masses
(above 5 significant quantities) therefore does not help distinguish between fuel cycles or
facilities.
In initial runs of the model, an "available mass" utility function was multiplied by the
proliferation resistance value at each segment. Because available masses were so high, the
"available mass" utility value was the same (very low), for each step of the cycle. In effect, then,
the available mass served to scale each step and each fuel cycle, without adding any information
to distinguish those steps or cycles. If available mass were to be included in the additive
weighting function, the fact that its utility value is the same for all steps and cycles means that it
would serve to merely shift the results; again, no information would be added.
As an alternative to a "total mass" metric, an analyst, in employing this methodology,
should do a final check to see qualitatively that masses remain high for each step and each fuel
cycle evaluated. He or she would then acknowledge that the methodology is inapplicable if there
are fewer than 5 significant quantities of material at any given step of an analyzed cycle, or
would find a way to incorporate the effects of total masses.
2.6 Weighting Function
A linear-additive weighting function was chosen for this model because it is the simplest.
It is by no means the best, and careful sensitivity analyses should check to see how robust results
are to the form and values of the function; a rough exploration of this sensitivity is discussed in
Chapter 5. The function has the same form as that used by William Charlton in his 2003
paper.[ 11] The equation for utility value weighting is:
PRseg = WiUi (Xi ,seg) (8)
where PRseg is the proliferation resistance of a given segment, wi is the weight associated with
utility function (and thus metric) i, ui is the utility function for the ith property, and Xi,seg is the
controlling value for segment seg and metric i. The values of the weights (wi) depend on the
particular threat type, and are normalized to add up to a value that depends on the threat. The
numbers are shown below in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9 Weights for Subnational & Host State Threats: Linear-Additive Weighting
Function
Weight (wi)
Metric Subnational Host State
Throughput 0.10 0.06
Decay Heat from Pu 0.05 0.06
Spontaneous Fission 0.05 0.07
Separability 0.05 0.04
Concentration 0.05 0.12
Radioactivity 0.20 0.10
Facility Type 0.20 0.12
Process -- Counting 0.05 0.06
Detectability 0.10 0.08
Enrichment 0.10 0.12
Mass and Bulk 0.05 0.07
Total 1.00 0.90
Determination of the Weights
Charlton used expert elicitation to obtain the particular weight values used in his analysis.
Elicitation is the most rigorous method available for assigning values to these inherently
subjective variables. While time and scope did not permit use of a formal elicitation process in
this work, the ratios of the weights used by Charlton were preserved in the case of the host
nation.[ 11] Charlton evaluated proliferation resistance only in the face of a host state threat.
For the subnational threat, values were approximated and based loosely on the qualitative
weights identified in the TOPS report. TOPS designated certain barriers to proliferation as high,
moderate to high, moderate, low, and very low in importance.[9]
Normalization
In addition to being subjective, the weights also do not entirely reflect the differences
between the two types of proliferator. Qualitatively, one might expect that the overall
proliferation resistance in the face of a subnational actor would be greater than that for a host
nation. Countries will in general have more resources and sophisticated technology at their
disposal than will subnational groups. In order to coarsely reflect these differences, the weights
for the subnational add to a value of one, while the weights for the host state add to 0.9. This is
essentially an arbitrary approximation to capture the lower overall proliferation resistance of a
state threat.
A better model could be made by incorporating a more complete definition of the threats.
If it were possible to estimate a range of resources available to certain threat types, the ratio of
normalization factors could be assigned according to those resource levels. Further research into
the probable characteristics and resources of threats would be useful, although the final
normalization factors would still be considerably uncertain.
The normalization factors also serve as the proliferation resistance value assigned to any
"reactor" step in the fuel cycle. This analysis assumes that proliferation resistance will be at its
highest point at the reactor step. The reactor environment is harsh and radioactive, rendering
material in the core nearly impossible to steal. Any proliferator would have to effectively shut
down the reactor in order to procure the fuel.
A reactor shutdown and subsequent material diversion would be nearly impossible for a
subnational to accomplish. A sudden and unplanned shutdown, forced by plant outsiders, would
attract the attention of the international community, and would require much more effort than
virtually any other route to steal material. Therefore, the proliferation resistance value of
average material inside a nuclear reactor is one for a subnational threat. This represents
essentially "perfect" proliferation resistance. For a host nation, the material in a reactor is still
somewhat vulnerable. With greater control over the reactor property and employees, it is
conceivable that a host state could work to mask a plant shutdown as part of some problem, and
use the time to divert fuel. Even so, these actions are likely to be discovered by IAEA inspection
practices, and again, involve substantial effort compared to other proliferation routes. The very
high proliferation resistance, coupled with a slim chance of material access, renders a score of
0.9 for the reactor step under sovereign threat.
Other Options for the Functional Form
One function considered originally for this work took the form of a combination of
multiplicative and linear-additive terms. The idea was that generally dependent variables would
be added, each with their respective weights. Then independent groups of variables
(corresponding roughly to the categories above of material characteristics, material handling, and
facility characteristics) were multiplied together. Finally, the entire value was multiplied by a
utility of the mass available at each facility (see above).
The primary difficulties with this approach were determining a proper normalization and
understanding easily the structure and results. The complicated functional form was not
transparent, and likely would have confounded important audience members unversed in
mathematics. In addition, the definitions of which metrics were "independent" and which were
"dependent" could not be consistently applied. There was some overlap in the categories.
Yet a third option for the functional form is a purely multiplicative one. These types of
functions have been used by various others at MIT (see the thesis work of M. Visosky[12] and T.
Boscher[13]). For this case, the utilities of all metrics would be multiplied together.
There are two primary limitations to this function. One is that any single metric, if it
produced a very low utility value, could bring the total proliferation resistance essentially to zero.
Along with that problem is the fact that weights could not be used to represent the relative
importance of the metrics.
Perhaps the greatest limitation associated with the weighting function is the probable
sensitivity of the ultimate results to the functional form and values. If the final results appear
fairly robust in the face of weighting function adjustments, this method could be quite useful. If,
on the other hand, the weighting function drastically affects the program outcomes, the
methodology may have to be abandoned. This assumes that no weighting function form and
values become somehow universally accepted for use with MAUT and proliferation resistance
analysis; if experts one day agree on a particular proliferation resistance assessment methodology,
it could be programmed and utilized in fuel cycle simulations. These limitations are explored
further in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3 - Technology Reference Cases
3.1 The Once-Through Fuel Cycle
The United States employs the once-through fuel cycle exclusively. Once-through is
more linear than cyclical: it involves mining and milling fresh uranium, enriching and fabricating
it into reactor fuel, and then disposing of the spent fuel without any further processing (other
than cooling). A schematic below (Figure 3.1) shows the steps in the cycle, segmented for the
purposes of proliferation resistance assessment. For this and all further schematics, blue boxes
represent those segments which are analyzed by the methodology of Chapter 2.
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Figure 3.1 Schematic of the once-through fuel cycle
The three white boxes, representing steps which are not analyzed, are the mining &
milling, enrichment & conversion, and reactor steps. The treatment of the reactor step is
explained above in section 2.6. The mining & milling step is not analyzed because the only
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material present at that segment is natural uranium. Natural uranium is not considered a
proliferation concern, because the material is widely available and nearly impossible to explode.
By contrast, the enrichment step of the fuel cycle is a particular focus of proliferation
concern. Worldwide attention is now focused directly on this issue as a result of Iran's
insistence in pursuing uranium enrichment; though Iran claims its efforts are entirely peaceful,
suspicions abound that the country is actually working toward an ability to produce weapons-
grade uranium. The enrichment step should certainly be analyzed by proliferation resistance
analysis. The primary reason for its exclusion in this study was a lack of time, coupled with the
complications posed by having both enriched and natural uranium in one segment.
In addition, the main proliferation concern with the enrichment step is the knowledge
gained by performing the process. Once a country or proliferating actor masters the ability to
enrich uranium, even to a low level, that proliferator can (with relative ease) modify the process
to enrich uranium to 90% and above. Such highly-enriched uranium is the easiest nuclear
material to detonate. Possession of this knowledge and the required equipment is extremely
useful if the proliferator wishes to operate by breakout (in the case of Iran) or by constructing a
clandestine facility. Neither of those proliferation routes is considered in this particular study,
alleviating somewhat the need for analyzing the enrichment segment.
Finally, the enrichment step will be exactly the same for all fuel cycles. Regardless of the
fuel cycle chosen, some enriched uranium will be needed. The only difference between cycles
will be in the amount of uranium processed. Because the material itself is not a high
proliferation concern (only LEU and natural uranium in the segment), and because the amount of
material processed is far less important than the knowledge and experience gained by performing
enrichment, results from this segment are unlikely to help distinguish one fuel cycle from
another.
Nevertheless, proliferation experts should remain highly concentrated on this step.
Policymakers, scientists and the public welcome any technological or institutional methods
aimed at breaking the connection between enrichment and a nuclear weapon. Proliferation
resistance assessments might assist in this area, by including the enrichment step and analyzing
breakout and clandestine proliferation paths. It may not be possible to fully automate those types
of analyses within a computer program, especially during early design development, but further
research may make this possible.
Advantages
The once-through fuel cycle is highly advantageous, as demonstrated by the United
States' exclusive adherence to it. One advantage is its lower cost; reprocessing is expensive.
Another advantage is that all fissile materials are embedded in material with: high radioactivity,
and this renders the spent fuel qualitatively more proliferation resistant. The high burnups in
conventional LWRs further contribute to proliferation resistance, by ensuring that large amounts
of even Pu isotopes and other built-up poisons make an unattractive weapon material. Finally,
the once-through fuel cycle has probable safety advantages. With very little processing of spent
fuel, workers and the public may be at lower risk for radiation exposure.
Disadvantages
The primary disadvantage to the once-through fuel cycle is that it creates huge amounts
of spent fuel for disposal. The energy content of the fuel is not well-utilized; Pu-239 and other
fertile isotopes could provide more electricity if reprocessed. Even more importantly, spent fuel
disposal has proved to be an expensive and politically nightmarish process. The U.S. has spent
30 years and over $9 billion trying to open a repository at Yucca Mountain, and the fate of the
project remains somewhat uncertain. A three-fold increase in U.S. nuclear power would require
a new repository be built in the U.S. every 12 years (assuming that the statutory limit of 70,000
MTHM per repository stands).[42] The challenges of siting such repositories would be
formidable; the amount of money and political capital needed for such projects would be
unimaginably high.
Data Source
The basic data for the proliferation resistance assessment of the once-through cycle,
including isotopic vectors, comes from a simulation study by Nicephore Bonnet.[43] Bonnet's
work involved optimization of a fuel cycle simulation, called CAFCA III. He assumed a typical
3-batch LWR, loaded with 77 MT of heavy metal, operating at 1000MWe with a burnup of
50MWd/kgHM. Isotopic vectors were provided for 1 MT initial HM, both before and after
irradiation in the LWR.
3.2 Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Cycle
MOX recycling has proved to be fairly popular around the world. France has practiced it
for over 40 years, and Japan recently built a MOX reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-Mura. MOX
fuel is made by the so-called Plutonium Recovery and Extraction (PUREX) process, which was
originally developed during the Manhattan Project to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons
(see Fig 3.2). Because PUREX creates a pure plutonium stream, and indeed was first conceived
for weapon construction, the U.S. banned reprocessing in the 1970's under the Carter
administration, but this ban was lifted by President Reagan in the early 1980's. PUREX remains
a central focus of proliferation concern.
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Figure 3.2 Schematic of the MOX-UE fuel cycle
Like those of the once-through cycle, only the shaded boxes will be processed for the
proliferation resistance assessment of the MOX cycle. In addition, we make the assumption that
the MOX cycle has been running for some time. A regular U0 2 cycle runs alongside the MOX
cycle, and U0 2 spent fuel provides new fuel for MOX reactors. We assume that MOX fuel
exists at all stages of its cycle. Only the MOX cycle is analyzed here; the values for the normal
LWR piece of the cycle will be identical to those for the once-through strategy.
Advantages
The main advantage of the MOX fuel cycles is that they are in use around the world, so
any engineering problems with PUREX processing have been largely overcome. Certainly in the
short term, this will also make MOX cheaper than other reprocessing alternatives.
Disadvantages
There are several disadvantages to a MOX cycle. The primary one, mentioned above, is
that a pure stream of plutonium is created during the PUREX process that would make an
attractive proliferator target. A second problem is that, especially if the MOX fuel is recycled
only once (as currently done in France), there may be very little benefit in terms of decreased
utilization of a waste repository. Spent MOX fuel is especially hot, and heat is the most
important limiting factor of repository space.
Finally, most people agree that MOX is more expensive than the once-through fuel cycle
(see, e.g., the work of Matthew Bunn and John Holdren [26]). There are some, however, who
contend that the MOX cycle used in France can compete economically with the U.S. once-
through cycle (see, e.g., the Boston Consulting Group study done for AREVA [44]).
Data Source
The reference technology concept chosen for MOX is the MOX-Enriched Uranium
(MOX-UE) strategy envisioned by the French nuclear agency CEA. Plutonium is recycled in
all-MOX assemblies, and the entire core consists of MOX assemblies. MOX fuel cools for 5
years after discharge, and then the Pu is extracted. The Pu then decays for another 2 years as it is
fabricated into new MOX fuel. As the Pu degrades with further recycles, it is mixed with freshly
discharged Pu and with enriched U0 2. The isotopic vectors for the fuel both before and after
irradiation were provided by Mark Visosky.[12]
3.3 The COmbined Non-Fertile and UO2 (CONFU) Fuel Cycle
The CONFU fuel cycle is a strategy for recycling spent fuel in thermal reactors. Spent
LWR fuel is reprocessed, at which time the spent uranium is separated from other actinides.
Fission products are removed as well, and the remaining isotopes are fashioned into fertile-free
fuel (FFF) pins. The assembly has the same configuration as a Westinghouse 17x17 PWR
assembly. About 80 FFF pins are loaded into a CONFU assembly; the remaining pins are
standard UO2 pins. CONFU assemblies are then loaded as a CONFU batch into a PWR, and
flexibility in the arrangement of FFF pins in an assembly allows up to three CONFU batches in a
reactor. A schematic of the CONFU fuel cycle is shown below in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3 Schematic of the CONFU fuel cycle
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One can see from the schematic that all elements of the once-through fuel cycle are
present in CONFU. Uranium will still have to be mined, enriched, fabricated, irradiated, and
cooled, and some products from reprocessing and other steps will still need to go to a permanent
repository (represented here as "storage"). In addition, not all LWRs will necessarily have a
CONFU batch at any given time, and those with only U0 2 will see essentially what appears to be
a once-through fuel cycle. The only difference will be in the waste-related segments.
As for MOX, the CONFU segments that are the same as the once-through strategy will be
ignored in the proliferation resistance calculation. The calculation assumes that FFF exists at all
possible phases of the fuel cycle, or in other words, that the cycle analyzed is not the start of a
CONFU strategy but is one where CONFU fuel has been present for some time.
Advantages
The clear advantage CONFU has over the once-through cycle is a minimization of waste
going to final disposal. MIT studies have demonstrated that CONFU strategies can achieve net
destruction of transuranic elements (TRU), leaving the shorter-lived fission products as the
primary wastes.[45]
CONFU also has an advantage over other advanced recycling systems, such as
transmutation schemes or advanced burner reactors: the needed reactors are already deployed
throughout the world. CONFU is a lower-cost option than others requiring new reactors,
extensive R&D and gradual commercialization.
Disadvantages
One primary disadvantage of CONFU is that it still requires considerable storage of
recycled uranium. If a serious goal is destruction of transuranic waste, CONFU reactors can
burn only about a maximum of about 20.6g TRU per assembly with 6 years of cooling. Last, the
total cost of electricity generated from a CONFU fuel cycle is (nearly two times) greater than
that from a once-through cycle.[45]
Data Source
Isotopic vectors for the CONFU case come from Youssef Shatilla.[45] Each CONFU
assembly has 84 FFF pins, and UO2 pins include uranium enriched to 4.5% (after the first
recycle). Spent fuel is allowed to cool for 6 years after discharge from the reactor, and then is
reprocessed for further recycles in LWRs. The data is that from the second recycle of CONFU
fuel.
3.4 Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) Fuel Cycles
The ABR is a concept that is proposed by the United States for recycling waste and
improving the chances for nuclear energy growth. ABRs represent a good option for destroying
transuranic elements, which are the most long-lived products present in the 40-year legacy
buildup of American spent fuel. Fast reactors that burn TRU, with some modification, can also
produce more plutonium fuel for reactors. Such reactors are called "Advanced Breeder
Reactors" and are planned by nations like Japan and France, which lack their own sources of
uranium. Russia and China are interested in breeders as well; they see breeder reactors as a way
to maximize energy production from uranium. The U.S. is more interested in burning actinides
than in producing fuel, because it has an immense waste legacy and considerable uranium
deposits, and so is looking to develop the ABR within the Generation IV Forum and GNEP. A
schematic for the ABR fuel cycle is shown below in Figure 3.4.
For the ABR cases, we do not assume an equilibrium or "already running" fuel cycle.
Instead, we look individually at startup and equilibrium scenarios. For the startup scenario, a
decision has been made to switch from an all-LWR fleet to one that includes ABRs. All ABR
fuel is thus constructed entirely of spent LWR fuel. Equilibrium fuel, by contrast, contains both
spent LWR fuel and spent ABR fuel. At this stage, the rates of spent LWR fuel usage,
reprocessing, and waste deposition stay constant through time.
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Figure 3.4 Schematic of the ABR fuel cycle
Advantages
Implementing an ABR fuel cycle is the best and fastest strategy for burning transuranics.
Utilization of fast-spectrum neutrons enables ABRs to produce electricity and burn unneeded
transuranic "waste" at the same time. Because ABRs efficiently destroy TRU, the ABR fuel
cycle is likely to most effectively decrease the burden on a permanent repository. The
destruction of TRU reduces the radioactivity and heat barriers of waste that will have to be stored.
[46]
In terms of proliferation resistance, burner reactors offer a significant advantage over
breeder reactors; they destroy, rather than create, plutonium that otherwise could be used for a
nuclear weapon.
Finally, ABR technology is flexible. If uranium resources become scarce and expensive,
relatively modest modifications can bring it to a breeding capacity. In theory, the fast reactors
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like a modified ABR could be nearly self-sustaining and obviate the need for extensive uranium
mining.[ 17] Though the United States currently has interest only in burner reactors, this
flexibility makes the technology attractive to several other states with different fuel concerns.
U.S. collaboration with other countries on ABR technology will likely lead to better designs and
could even provide a basis for an internationally standardized reactor.
Disadvantaees
The primary disadvantage, from the point of view of the United States, is the same
flexibility issue that represents an advantage in certain contexts. The flexibility to turn a burner
reactor into a breeder is dangerous; expansion of ABR technology could lead to an expansion of
the ability to produce plutonium for weapons. If countries with nefarious purposes acquired
burner technology, they could create plutonium with relative ease by adding a fertile blanket to
the reactor and making other modifications.
A second and significant disadvantage is the cost of the system. Much work remains to
be done in designing the reactor, and still more to make it commercially viable. Even then, the
cost will be high. Furthermore, the U.S. has virtually no experience with ABR fuel with very
high TRU enrichments. High TRU enrichments are ideal for maximum TRU burning, but the
R&D needed to understand the fuel's behavior will come at a price. In addition, though initial
studies show potentially good controllability and reactor parameters with this type of fuel,[47]
safety could be an issue with such an innovative reactor and fuel system. The overall costs
associated with this fuel cycle are certainly the highest of all reference systems studied here.
Data Source
Isotopic vectors were provided by Edward Hoffman of ANL, modified slightly from
those calculated in his 2006 report on preliminary core design studies for the ABR.[47] The
particular ABR used by Hoffman, et al. for reference was based on the S-PRISM design by
General Electric. The ABR core was made smaller, and the blankets used by the S-PRISM
breeder were removed. The core size remained the same even as very different assembly
configurations were introduced for different conversion ratios.
Hoffman studied 5 conversion ratios: 1.00, 0.75, 0.50, 0.25, and 0.00. Three of these
cases are analyzed here for their proliferation resistance characteristics. Only oxide fuel is
studied here (though Hoffman looks also at metal fuel). The first case is conversion ratio = 1.00,
for which the needed TRU amount is lowest (about 17% by weight in uranium matrix) and about
the same amount of TRU is destroyed as generated. The second is conversion ratio = 0.50, with
an average TRU enrichment of 38%. Last is conversion ratio = 0.0, with average TRU
enrichment of 100%. The CR = 0.0 core essentially bums TRU in an inert matrix, and does not
create any TRU (it does actually create a tiny amount of plutonium - but the conversion ratio is
nonetheless very close to zero). Spent fuel from all ABRs is allowed to cool for six years before
being recycled.
Hoffman studied both startup and equilibrium cores. The startup ABR core includes only
fuel made from spent LWR fuel. Equilibrium cores, however, include both spent LWR fuel and
spent ABR fuel. These two cases are examined separately for their proliferation resistance
characteristics.
3.5 Processing of the Reference Technology Data
All sources generously provided full isotopic data for fuel loaded into and discharged
from each reactor. The isotopic vectors were converted into units of grams per MTHM. These
vectors were then arranged on ORIGEN2 input cards, and processed through an ORIGEN2
decay module. The decays requested were 1 second, 1 day, 15 days, 30 days and 60 days for the
front-end of the fuel cycle, and the same plus 6 years, 6.1 years, and 6.2 years after discharge.
ORIGEN2 outputs included the isotopic vectors at each timestep, as well as the decay heat,
radioactivity, and neutron emissions of each isotope. Photon emissions by energy group (18
energy groups in all) were also calculated.
There is a slight discrepancy between the ORIGEN2 calculations and the true isotopic
vectors at the front-end of the cycle. This is because in general, each data source provided
vectors for immediate loading into a reactor. ORIGEN2 decays these vectors forward, so that in
actuality, ORIGEN2 calculates what the isotopics would be if fresh fuel ready for loading
actually sat instead for another two months. The vectors 2 months before loading are not
calculated.
This problem could be completely remedied if ORIGEN2 or another program could
essentially reverse the decay and back-calculate the true isotopes present in steps before reactor
loading. However, the results presented in this study should still be approximately correct.
Decays over two months show relatively small changes in the fuel isotopics, even for ABR fuel -
which contains more interesting isotopes than standard UO 2 fuel. Furthermore, the trends of
changing isotopes should be similar whether the changes are back-calculated from the given
vectors or decayed forward. The results then, though not exact, should give decent results for
comparing trends within a cycle and overall between fuel cycle types.
After ORIGEN2 provides detailed information on the isotopic vectors, the output cards
are arranged to contain only the information relevant to the proliferation resistance analysis. The
resulting text file then becomes input to a proliferation resistance calculation program. The
proliferation resistance program is coded in MATLAB72. (See Appendix 1 for the full
MATLAB72 code).
The MATLAB code is quite simple. It reads the text file and creates variables for each of
the different categories: isotope mass, decay heat, radioactivity, neutron emissions, and photon
emissions. It also reads in the name of each isotope and associates it with its respective
characteristics. The code then calculates utility values using the equations and scales described
in Chapter 2. Finally, the code aggregates the utility functions for each segment using the
specified weights, and plots the resulting proliferation resistance values of each segment vs. time.
These values are then re-plotted in Microsoft Excel for ease of viewing.
The author here would like to stress that the processing methods described above are not
the only means of performing the analysis. It was important that this methodology aim for
working in conjunction with fuel cycle simulations, so the easiest and most flexible option was to
begin with a program that read text files. If coded within a fuel cycle simulation, the program
would thus take a text file output from the simulation and use it as input to the proliferation
resistance calculation. Greater program flexibility and utility might be achieved, however, if the
proliferation resistance calculation were embedded directly in the fuel cycle simulation. The
simplicity of the methodology, and especially of the utility and weighting function structure,
should allow for that.
Chapter 4 - Proliferation Resistance Calculation Results and
Comparisons
4.1 Once-Through Fuel Cycle Results
The once-through cycle is often used as a baseline for comparison of fuel cycle
proliferation resistance characteristics. Calculating once-through proliferation resistance gives
insight into the viability of the model, because analysts have a good qualitative sense of where
weaknesses lie. Analysts often surmise that the once through-cycle is safest from proliferation
because of the extreme radioactivity of spent fuel, and because no reprocessing step exists to
separate pure plutonium.
Results of this proliferation resistance calculation, performed as described in Section 3.5,
are shown below in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 Proliferation resistance of the once-through fuel cycle, including segment labels
As expected, the proliferation resistance is generally somewhat higher in the face of a
subnational actor than in the presence of a host nation. This makes sense because a host nation
will generally have more technological and monetary resources to complete a proliferation
attempt. The difference is a result of the different normalizations for the threat types (see section
2.6). Despite these normalizations, however, the proliferation resistance in the face of a
subnational actually dives below that for a host nation at each transportation step and at the front-
end of the fuel cycle. This reflects the relative weights.
Subnationals are more likely to succeed by attacking a transport segment, because there
will be fewer entrenched safeguards. A host nation, with some measure of control over its
safeguards, will not find the challenge particularly different if the material of interest is in a truck
vs. stationary facility. For this reason, the host nation weight is proportionally smaller than the
subnational weight for "facility type" utility, and transport segments are shown to be especially
vulnerable to non-state actors.
For the fabrication and loading steps, the proliferation resistance values are slightly
higher for the host nation, despite the fact that a nation would have greater resources to turn LEU
into weapons material. This seems counterintuitive. Spontaneous fission accounts for the
values: high spontaneous fission rates are especially unattractive to host nations because they
desire reliable yields. The weight for spontaneous fission is thus high for a subnational. This,
combined with the fact that the spontaneous fission utility value is set to 1 (no Pu is present in
the material), pushes the host nation proliferation resistance slightly above that of the subnational.
In reality, we would expect LEU to be equally useless to every type of proliferator. This is more
or less borne out by the results. The next chapter will discuss the sensitivity of these results, and
sheds some light on the significance of the difference.
One striking feature of the plot is a dramatic overall decrease in proliferation resistance
for BOTH threats at the transport steps. This makes some intuitive sense; transport segments are
difficult to protect. The low value for transport segments also reflects the binary nature of the
"facility type" utility scale. Because the utility can take only one of two values, and because
"facility type" is weighted highly for both types (though less percentage-wise for the host nation
threat), stark differences between stationary and transport segments appear on the final
proliferation resistance graph.
As discussed above, the proliferation resistance values at the "reactor" step are set outside
the model, and then used as normalization constants for the weights. The proliferation resistance
at all other segments is lower than in the reactor.
At the back-end of the fuel cycle, an interim storage facility has slightly higher
proliferation resistance than the cooling pool segment. This is because the fuel has been
consolidated and likely vitrified at the interim storage step, and presumably is arranged in large
above-ground storage canisters that are particularly safe and impermeable.
One last slightly puzzling aspect of the graph is the relatively low values of proliferation
resistance for fabrication and loading. This seems strange because the material at those steps is
fairly innocuous, containing only uranium enriched to 5% or less and no plutonium. Making a
bomb with such material would be EXTREMELY difficult and perhaps impossible for a low-
technology actor, and as described in Chapter 2, we assume that neither proliferator has
enrichment capabilities.
One reason for the low value at fabrication is that the "separability" utility value dips low
at the fabrication step. In a fabrication facility, the material of interest is not surrounded by
cladding and structural materials that would be a barrier to separation. The "loading" stage then
exhibits higher proliferation resistance, but it is not much higher than the values for the cooling
step where plutonium is present.
At first glance, on the other hand, the low value for once-through fabrication might be
accurate: perhaps the ultimate difference in proliferation resistance for cooling and fresh UO2
fuel should not be especially large. It may be easier for a proliferator to acquire enrichment
capabilities and fresh UO2 fuel than to avoid spent fuel radioactivity and overcome the technical
problems of heat and spontaneous fission in a plutonium weapon. But were a proliferator to
obtain enrichment tools, he would be able to convert uranium directly from its natural state. A
state actor would probably not find the time saved by feeding 5% enriched uranium worth the
risk of stealing it from a protected fuel cycle. A subnational, however, might find the risk quite
worthwhile. Because they are more restricted in time, resources, and technological experience, it
makes sense that LEU is slightly more vulnerable to subnationals.
Comparison to W. Charlton's Analysis
The qualitative shape of the above proliferation resistance plot mostly agrees with a
similar plot produced by Charlton (see Figure 4.2).
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Fig. 14. Proliferation resistance value as a function of time in process for once-through fuel cycle.
Figure 4.2 Proliferation resistance graph for once-through cycle by Charlton (2003)[11]
As does this analysis, Charlton concludes that the proliferation resistance of the
fabrication step is fairly low. His fabrication proliferation resistance value is almost as low as
that for enrichment, and is slightly higher than the proliferation resistance value for an interim
repository. As with the analysis in this thesis, Charlton's cooling step (labeled as "wet fuel
storage") has a higher proliferation resistance value than fabrication. Also similar to the two
studies is the fact that the reactor processing steps are the highest of all.
One discrepancy between Charlton's analysis and that presented here is the difference in
value of the interim storage segment (labeled by Charlton as a "geologic repository"). The
calculation in this thesis finds an interim storage value that is initially slightly higher than that for
cooling storage. Charlton, by contrast, publishes a proliferation resistance value significantly
lower for final disposal than for wet fuel storage. The reason may be that Charlton considers a
cooling period (or "wet fuel storage" period) somewhat longer than 20 years. If the fuel sits in a
wet storage pool for 20 years, the radioactivity and heat barrier will begin to decay. Fuel
emplaced in dry storage at that point will thus be lower in proliferation resistance than the fresher
fuel in wet storage. In our analysis, the cooling period is only six years, so heat and radioactivity
levels have not significantly decreased when fuel is removed from wet storage. Under that
circumstance, moving the fuel to a centralized, dry storage facility actually provides a
proliferation resistance benefit that just slightly overcomes the six-year decrease in heat and
radioactivity.
Charlton's analysis and these results thus still may be consistent, as long as both show the
expected decrease in proliferation resistance over long time periods. Figure 4.2 above shows that
Charlton did find decreasing proliferation resistance over time; Figure 4.3 below shows that this
methodology results in the same behavior.
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Figure 4.3 Proliferation resistance of the once-through fuel cycle: expanded timescale
As in Figure 4.1, the fuel is placed in dry storage at t = 12.8 years, or six years after
reactor discharge. From that point forward, Figure 4.3 shows the steady decrease in proliferation
resistance due to degradation of the radioactivity and heat barriers. Very striking is the similarity
between Figure 4.3 and Charlton's comparable analysis: both show the same decrease in
proliferation resistance over 1000 years of dry fuel storage, from values of about 0.65 to 0.6.
Overall, therefore, the results of this methodology agree fairly well with those of Charlton.
Comparison to M. Visosky's Analysis
In his thesis work, Mark Visosky focused on the back-end of the fuel cycle as the primary
discriminator between nuclear power systems. He used a multiplicative function to combine
attributes for the various steps in the fuel cycle, but his results generally agree with those
presented in this paper. Visosky makes calculations for a factor he calls the "vulnerability
index," so unlike values for "proliferation resistance," higher values in Visosky's analysis are
more problematic for a safeguarder.
Visosky finds that the static vulnerability index for a cycle is constant for the first five
years as the spent UO2 fuel cools (see Figure 4-3).[12](p. 212) Vulnerability then increases
sharply when the fuel is transported to storage, and then decreases almost to the cooling value
once the fuel is in a repository. Interestingly, for Visosky as well as for this analysis, the
proliferation resistances at the cooling and storage steps are nearly the same. Visosky agrees
with Charlton on the direction of the difference, however: Visosky's calculation attributes
slightly higher vulnerability to material in storage.
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4.2 MOX Results
As expected, the proliferation resistance calculations for the MOX fuel cycle show
vulnerability at the reprocessing step. The results are presented graphically in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5 Proliferation resistance graph of the MOX fuel cycle
The proliferation resistance values closely resemble those for the once-through fuel cycle.
Here, the fabrication, transport, and loading steps are those for MOX fuel (i.e. this graph does
not include the proliferation resistance values for the normal UO2 LWR fuel, even though such
fuel would necessarily be part of the cycle). These front-end values are somewhat higher than
those in the once-through cycle, due largely to the presence of plutonium in the MOX fuel (see
explanation in section 4.1). Again, this is somewhat contradictory to expectation: we would
imagine the presence of plutonium to decrease rather than increase the proliferation resistance.
At the reprocessing step, the proliferation resistance dives to its second-lowest value for
the cycle. The host state and subnational values are coincidentally and approximately equal to
those for the fabrication step of the once-through cycle. This is because the MOX reprocessing
step includes a pure stream of plutonium, which has no structural materials and also is processed
in a continuous and difficult-to-track manner. The fact that the proliferation resistance value at
this step is above that of the once-through fabrication step is somewhat strange. It is further
testament that adjustments are needed for the model's analysis of uranium fuel.
Comparison to W. Charlton's Analysis
Although Charlton did not analyze and graph a complete MOX fuel cycle, he did assess
the PUREX process for its proliferation resistance characteristics. He first segmented different
steps involved in PUREX processing, and analyzed each one according to his method. He
looked at the material and facility characteristics for each stage and established a proliferation
resistance value for each one; these correspond to the proliferation resistance values calculated in
this analysis for each fuel cycle segment. Charlton then aggregates these values one step further,
to obtain a "total nuclear security measure" for the PUREX process. The second aggregation
includes weighting by the material mass and time spent in each segment.
His final result was a nuclear security measure of 0.28 for PUREX (the lowest of all
systems he studied), vs. a measure of 0.93 for a PWR. The material in a PUREX reprocessing
step is thus about 1/3 as proliferation resistant as material in a reactor, according to Charlton.
The ratio is not present in this paper's analysis. The methodology in this thesis leads to a
reprocessing step value that is about /2 the proliferation resistance value inside the reactor. The
distinction is probably not of great importance. Judgment calls are made in all proliferation
resistance analyses about which metrics to include, how to formulate utility functions, and finally
how to weight them. These decisions are all somewhat subjective and certainly arguable. It is
quite likely that the quantitative difference in the two analyses can be traced to these types of
choices; further research should test the link.
Comparison to M. Visosky's Analysis
Like Charlton, Visosky presents his MOX results with a higher level of aggregation than
conducted in this analysis. Visosky does not demonstrate proliferation vulnerabilities for each
segment in a MOX cycle, but instead aggregates to a single index for MOX-UE. He calculates
the vulnerability index for each of eight MOX recycles, and then integrates them together over
time with a 10% discount rate (akin to the discount rate used in economics).
His conclusion is that the MOX cycle is the least proliferation resistant of four cycle
types he studies. The ratio of the vulnerability indices (9.67 for MOX and 6.79 for once-
through) indicates that the MOX cycle is about 70% as proliferation resistant as once-through.
With Charlton placing this ratio at about 30%, this analysis splits the difference between these
two in attaining a proliferation resistance ratio of about 50%.
4.3 CONFU Results
The CONFU result demonstrates greater proliferation resistance than does the MOX fuel
cycle: each point on the graph below (Figure 4-5) is greater than the corresponding point on the
MOX graph above.
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Figure 4.6 Graph of CONFU fuel cycle proliferation resistance
The front-end of the CONFU fuel cycle, at the fabrication, initial transportation, and
loading steps, is more proliferation resistant than the corresponding MOX steps. The primary
reason for this is that material in the fabrication and loading stages of the CONFU fuel cycle is
especially radioactive. Though the fission products and uranium have been removed from the
spent fuel that makes up CONFU FFF pins, the presence of the minor actinides means more
radioactivity than from plutonium alone. These steps of the CONFU cycle also have greater
proliferation resistance values than the once-through front-end steps. This is due to the
plutonium and minor actinides present in the FFF fuel loaded into CONFU reactors.
The proliferation resistance of the cooling and reprocessing steps is greater for CONFU
than MOX and once-through because of the lower concentration, higher radioactivity and greater
mass and bulk of CONFU fuel when it is removed from the reactor.
Comparison to W. Charlton's Work
Again, the comparison between the analysis here and Charlton's work is not perfectly
matched. Charlton segmented and analyzed a complete, closed fuel cycle including UREX
recycling and an accelerator driven system (ADS) to transmute spent fuel (see Figure 4.6). The
ADS bombards spent fuel with neutrons, effectively bringing it to an extremely high burnup.
More complete transmutation is achieved because the system does not need to meet requirements
for power production. This system is not considered in this analysis, because it is likely to be
relatively expensive.[48] U.S. near-term nuclear development strategies do not include
aggressive plans for an ADS.
Charlton does, however, perform his calculation on UREX as a simple process. He does
this in the same manner and with the same aggregation functions as his PUREX calculation, and
obtains a proliferation resistance value slightly higher than that for PUREX (0.35 rather than
0.28). This result generally agrees with the present analysis. Like Charlton's, the calculation
here shows UREX to be about 10% safer than PUREX processing. In both cases, this is due to
the retention of the minor actinides in the stream with plutonium.
Both UREX and PUREX are shown nevertheless to be quite vulnerable; most likely this
is because both Charlton's and this analysis put significant weight on the continuous processing
required to perform the separations. As explained above, the continuous process is more difficult
to monitor than batch processes which entirely comprise the once-through cycle.
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Fig. 16. Proliferation resistance value as a function of time in process for closed cycle.
Figure 4.7 Graph of W. Charlton analysis of a closed fuel cycle including UREX recycling
and accelerator-driven (ADS) transmutation of spent fuel[11]
The graph above shows Charlton's segment-by-segment proliferation resistance values
for the entire fuel cycle. The value for UREX separations is equal to a proliferation resistance
value of about 0.3 (slightly lower than that cited above, because time and mass weighting are not
included in this paper's proliferation resistance calculation). This UREX processing point is an
extreme dive in proliferation resistance compared to all other fuel cycle segments.
Charlton's low UREX value represents a significant departure from the results obtained
by our analysis. As shown in Figure 4.5, the proliferation resistance of CONFU recycling
(assumed to be a UREX process) is fairly close to the proliferation resistance of the fabrication
and loading steps, and is even above the fabrication and loading values for the once-through
cycle. For Charlton, however, the UREX value is about half those of fabrication and geologic
storage steps.
Further analysis is needed to determine the reasons for this difference. In his paper,
Charlton unfortunately did not include any information on the utility values aggregated to
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achieve the above results. A brief look at such values would provide insight into the discrepancy,
and could help pinpoint flaws in one or both analysis methods.
Comparison to M. Visosky's Work
Visosky looked at several different CONFU recycling strategies, and compared the
proliferation resistance of each one. Each had different cooling times for the spent FFF. Each
had quite comparable proliferation resistance characteristics and respective vulnerability indices.
Visosky found that the initial recycle of spent U0 2 was the most vulnerable, but that
vulnerability decreased for subsequent recycles. With each recycle, the Pu vector degrades
somewhat, as does the quality of other potential bomb-making material in the actinide vector.
Therefore, after about the first recycle, Visosky found that the CONFU strategy appears more
proliferation resistant than the once-through cycle. [12]
This demonstrates some agreement with the analysis presented here (showing results
from a second recycle of FFF). While the recycling step still poses a significant proliferation
risk, overall, both analyses show that it might be safer to conduct a CONFU fuel cycle than once-
through. This is because radiation barriers are high and plutonium is degraded after the first
initial recycle. The proliferation resistance of fabrication and loading steps are thus higher for
CONFU than are the disposal steps for once-through. (The values are also higher for CONFU
fabrication and loading than for once-through loading, according to this analysis, but as
explained above, this is rather counterintuitive and represents a potential mistake in the
methodology). Nevertheless, the Visosky analysis and the analysis here are in rough agreement.
Ultimately, it may be easier to safeguard a single (or several) distinct reprocessing
facilities, rather than remain concerned with the vast network of transportation and disposal
nodes required for the once-through cycle. Though the radiation barrier is high at first for once-
through material, the plutonium contained in the spent fuel is isotopically more favorable than
that from CONFU reactors.
4.4 ABR Results
The results for ABR fuel cycles, of three different ABR conversion ratios, are shown
below. No study has yet extensively examined the proliferation resistance characteristics of
ABR fuel cycles, so direct comparisons with this methodology's results cannot be made. In the
future, analyses completed with this methodology could provide insight to the major
vulnerabilities of ABR cycles. At this stage of methodological development, however, the
results are presented mostly as a check on internal consistency of the model with qualitative
expectations.
A graph was generated for each of six ABR scenarios: conversion ratios 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0,
and for each conversion ratio, a startup core and an equilibrium core. The scenarios are
presented below in Table 4.1, and results for conversion ratio 0.0 in Figures 4.7 and 4.8.
Table 4.1 Six ABR scenarios analyzed for proliferation
resistance characteristics
Case Conversion Ratio Core Type
1 0.0 Startup
2 0.0 Equilibrium
3 0.5 Startup
4 0.5 Equilibrium
5 1.0 Startup
6 1.0 Equilibrium
Proliferation Resistance of ABR Fuel Cycle at
Startup (CR = 0.0)
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Figure 4.8 Graph of ABR fuel
startup-core fuel composition
cycle proliferation resistance, for conversion ratio 0.0 and a
All six ABR results, including that shown in Figure 4.7, exhibit the same general
qualities seen in the CONFU results. Transportation steps have the lowest proliferation
resistance, and the reprocessing step has the lowest resistance of all stationary steps. It makes
sense that the locations of vulnerability within a given fuel cycle are the same for CONFU and
ABR because both employ UREX recycling.
The proliferation resistance value at fabrication is slightly lower for this ABR case than
for the same CONFU step. Interestingly, however, the average value of proliferation resistance
in the cooling step is greater for this ABR than for CONFU. The reasons are apparent from
graphs of the individual utility values. At the fabrication step, the radioactivity of material in the
CONFU cycle is much higher than for ABR fuel at a conversion ratio of 0.0 (at startup - ABR
fuel is spent U0 2 fuel). This gives the CONFU cycle greater proliferation resistance at the
fabrication step. However, the radioactivity of the remaining products is extremely high after
discharge from the ABR reactor, so that the radioactivity of the ABR spent fuel outstrips that of
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CONFU fuel during the cooling stage. The high radioactivity utility values dominate, especially
for subnational proliferation resistance, during the cooling step. The value for the ABR
reprocessing facility is actually a slight (but for practical purposes, imperceptible) drop from the
CONFU value. This is due to a small drop in the throughput utility; more material requires post-
irradiation processing for this ABR than for CONFU.
The proliferation resistance values for the equilibrium ABR cycle with conversion ratio
0.0 are somewhat higher than for startup (see Figure 4.8). "Equilibrium" fuel includes recycled
ABR fuel, as well as sufficient spent U0 2 fuel and depleted uranium to sustain power-producing
properties. The equilibrium proliferation resistance values are higher because both the
spontaneous fission rate and the radioactivity of the equilibrium fuel are significantly higher; the
detectability is slightly higher for equilibrium ABR fuel as well.
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Figure 4.9 Graph of proliferation resistance of the ABR fuel cycle with conversion ratio 0.0
and equilibrium fuel
Equilibrium values for all three conversion ratios are shown in Figure 4.4.3. Note that
the y-axis is truncated at a value of 0.4 to lend clarity to the graph.
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Figure 4.10 Graph of proliferation resistance for all three conversion ratios, equilibrium
fuel, both subnational and host state threats
The proliferation resistances for higher conversion ratios exhibit the same general trends
as for CR = 0.0. There is a shift in value, however, because the proliferation resistance for all
steps (aside from the reactor, which is set as a normalization constant) decreases with increasing
conversion ratio. There is a decrease in overall values of about 0.066 when moving from a
conversion ratio 0 to 0.5, and then a decrease of about 0.033 from conversion ratio 0.5 to 1.0.
The reason is that as conversion ratios become higher, more plutonium is created in the reactor.
An ABR operating at conversion ratio 1.0 produces roughly as much TRU as it bums. A fast
reactor with conversion ratio 0.0 burns the odd isotopes of plutonium especially well. Therefore,
the isotopic vector present at discharge (and recycled into the fabrication step), includes
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preferentially the hot Pu isotopes. This means then that the spontaneous fission, decay heat, and
radioactivity are all fairly high - leading to high proliferation resistance values.
The proliferation resistance for the startup cores, shown below in Figure 4.10, exhibits
essentially the same behavior. Notably, the differences in values between the three different
conversion ratios are smaller for the startup core; this is because all startup cores begin with
material similar between conversion ratios: spent U0 2 fuel, with an adjusted composition to
produce the desired conversion ratio and burnup characteristics, is used.
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Figure 4.11 Graph of proliferation resistance for all three conversion ratios, startup fuel,
both subnational and host nation threats
4.5 Comparison of Fuel Cycles
Figure 4.12 shows five of the six fuel cycles plotted together. The highest and lowest of
the ABR cycles (with conversion ratios 0.0 and 1.0, respectively) are plotted for the equilibrium
system. Values for once-through, CONFU, and MOX fuel cycles are graphed as well.
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One point of note is that all fuel cycles have very similar proliferation resistance values.
The shape of each fuel cycle is roughly the same, with only small numerical differences in
proliferation resistance. Another interesting observation is that other than the final step (the
"interim storage step" for once-through, "reprocessing" for all others) - represents the only
location where the once-through proliferation resistance is significantly high. The once-through
values are low for the front-end because of a lack of radioactivity (this may be a problem with
the methodology; we would expect the front-end values to be low for once-through because only
5% LEU is present). Though once-through proponents tout the self-shielding radiation barrier
shrouding spent once-through fuel, it appears that material from the other fuel cycles is in fact
more radioactive and less attractive to steal.
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Figure 4.12 Proliferation resistance of all fuel cycles plotted together
The MOX values are only slightly better than once-through at the back end, and MOX
reaches the lowest value of all cycles at the reprocessing step. The separation of pure, relatively
high-grade plutonium at that stage presents a significant vulnerability. Once-through and MOX
cycles, therefore, appear the least attractive overall from a proliferation resistance standpoint.
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The most attractive fuel cycle seems to be the ABR cycle with conversion ratio 0.0. The
values for both subnational and host state threats are higher at the cooling steps than for any
other cycle. Only the CONFU fuel cycle has higher proliferation resistance at the front-end.
Finally, even a last ABR processing step, where some of the fuel is assumed to be aqueous, has a
higher proliferation resistance value than storage of spent once-through fuel. Burning as much
of the transuranics as possible clearly has a strong proliferation benefit.
A final recommendation in favor of an ABROO fuel cycle would need to be balanced with
economics and fuel usage considerations. If, however, this methodology stands a few more tests,
such a recommendation could be made purely from the proliferation resistance view. That we
should avoid the once-through fuel cycle is a bit of a surprise; reprocessing and closed fuel
cycles have long been considered more vulnerable to proliferation. It may be that the
methodology gives "incorrect" results, but it also may be that these data suggest scrutinizing
further the role of radioactive "self-shielding" and the other qualities that render nuclear material
more or less appropriate for a weapon.
4.6 Summary of Results
In sum, the results seem to agree fairly well with expectations. The normalization of the
two threat types helps ensure that the proliferation resistance values are generally higher for a
subnational than a host nation; this makes sense because states will have more resources
available for diverting nuclear material. The transportation steps are the only ones for which the
subnational proliferation resistance is especially low, because those steps are prime targets for
terrorists. Against expectation, however, the once-through fuel cycle appears especially
vulnerable, while fast reactors like ABRs seem to be particularly safe. This is because either the
model is producing inappropriate results, or because original expectations were incorrect.
Further model testing will help determine if the former is true.
The proliferation resistance values do seem appropriately tied to the constituents of the
nuclear material. When the present isotopes increase decay heat, spontaneous neutron rate
and/or radioactivity, the proliferation resistance goes up. Many of the trends across and within
fuel cycle types seem fairly reasonable.
One problem with the methodology, apparent in the results, is that up to two or three
utility functions seem to be the sole drivers of the proliferation resistance shape. These tend to
be radioactivity and facility type, with occasional contributions from other factors. On one hand,
this may not be a problem; it may be that these metrics are appropriately the largest drivers of
proliferation risk. On the other hand, the dominance may suggest a particular sensitivity of the
results to the weighting function, because radioactivity and facility type have large weight
coefficients. Interestingly, however, the utility function values for radioactivity vary
considerably across fuel cycles; the facility type function varies significantly within fuel cycles
but is the same for each fuel cycle type. The fact that these two metrics tend to be the most
dynamic might also be the reason for their dominance.
Finally, all results exhibit only small numerical differences in the proliferation resistance
values both across and within fuel cycles. It could be that numerically close steps are in fact
similar in proliferation resistance characteristics. On the other hand, it may be that the
methodology is flawed and unable to accurately distinguish between the real proliferation risks.
The issue of ultimate numerical accuracy is discussed further in Chapter 6.
Chapter 5 - Weighting Function Sensitivity
5.1 Changing the Weights to Another Plausible Set
In order to determine the plausibility and applicability of this methodology, the
significance of the subjective pieces of the analysis must be carefully examined. Many aspects
of the methodology are subjective: the choice of metrics, the precise form and structure of the
utility functions, and the weighting function. Other components, such as assumptions about the
threat and the safeguards regime, are also somewhat subjective. At this time, however, these
latter two sets of assumptions are not directly tied to the methodology and therefore do not
directly impact the results.
Of the three important subjective components mentioned above, the weighting function
has the greatest potential to change the outcome of the analysis. This is because the weighting
function aggregates all utility functions and produces the final proliferation resistance value.
Adding or adjusting a utility function, by contrast, is likely to have only a small additive impact
within the weighted value. This chapter, therefore, is dedicated to exploring the outcomes when
the values and structure of the weighting function are adjusted. Various adjustments are applied
to the well-known once-through fuel cycle for illustration, as well as to the lesser-known
CONFU fuel cycle.
Table 5.1 shows a new set of weights to be used in the proliferation resistance code. The
former weighting values, identified in section 2.6 and used in the Chapter 4 analysis, are
presented in parentheses for reference. The new weights were chosen by the author. While the
first set of weights was based on Charlton's work[29] (for the Host Nation) and the TOPS
report[9] (for the subnational), the new weights reflect adjustments according to the author's
"expert" opinion. For this reason, the weights are identified as a new "plausible" set. Overall
normalizations (1.00 for subnational and 0.90 for the host nation) are preserved.
Table 5.1 New weight values used to calculate the single-step proliferation resistance value
Weight (wi) (prev. weight)
Metric Subnational Host State
Throughput 0.02 (0.10) 0.10 (0.06)
Decay Heat from Pu 0.08 (0.05) 0.07 (0.06)
Spontaneous Fission 0.06 (0.05) 0.13 (0.07)
Separability 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.04)
Concentration 0.05 (0.05) 0.06 (0.12)
Radioactivity 0.20 (0.20) 0.10 (0.10)
Facility Type 0.15 (0.20) 0.07 (0.12)
Process -- Counting 0.05 (0.05) 0.06 (0.06)
Detectability 0.10 (0.10) 0.08 (0.08)
Enrichment 0.20 (0.10) 0.12 (0.12)
Mass and Bulk 0.05 (0.05) 0.07 (0.07)
Total 1.00 0.90
The results of the calculation, using new weights, are shown for the once-through fuel
cycle in Figure 5.1. The trends appear to be generally the same as those demonstrated with the
previous weight set (see Section 4.1). Fabrication and loading values are essentially identical to
their previous values. At the back-end of the fuel cycle, the host nation values drop somewhat
below their previous points. Before, the host nation values were just below those of the
subnational at the cooling step, and the two threat types had identical values at the interim
storage step. Now the host nation proliferation resistance appears considerably worse.
The lower host nation values result primarily from the spontaneous fission metric. The
utility of spontaneous fission drops dramatically from the front-end of the fuel cycle (reflecting
the fact that no plutonium is present) to the back-end (where spontaneous fission is now higher,
but the presence of plutonium represents a huge proliferation risk). Essentially, once plutonium
is present, the proliferation resistance utility falls for both threat types. Then, as the spontaneous
fission rate increases due to more even Pu isotopes, the proliferation resistance increases as well.
With plutonium present but relatively little spontaneous fission, the back-end spontaneous fission
utility calculated for the once-through fuel cycle is especially low. Recall that with new weights,
these utility values are identical to those calculated in Chapter 4.
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The new weight set includes a host-nation spontaneous fission weight almost double that
of Chapter 4. This is meant to reflect the fact that nations desire highly reliable nuclear weapons
to use as a credible deterrent. Thus, plutonium with a relatively low rate of spontaneous fission
is highly attractive to a national actor. This accounts for the drop in host-state proliferation
resistance of the back-end of the once through fuel cycle, under the new set of weights.
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Figure 5.1 Proliferation resistance results for the first new set of "plausible" weights
In sum, increasing the weight of spontaneous fission for the host nation has the effect of
increasing the importance of plutonium. This makes sense because a national actor would have
greater resources to process Pu and make it into a weapon. The size of this host-nation drop is
not large. This also agrees with expectation: though plutonium is now more important than it
was with the Chapter 4 weights, other factors related to the presence of uranium are impacting
the proliferation resistance as well. Ultimately, the most important observations are that this
change in the weights evoke only a small change in the results (thus the methodology seems
robust), and this change happens along expected trends.
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Figure 5.2 shows the same weight set applied to the CONFU fuel cycle. The host nation
proliferation resistance values are lower here than in Chapter 4; this is the same pattern exhibited
by the back-end of the once through fuel cycle. The reasons for the drop are the same. With a
higher spontaneous fission weight value, the presence of plutonium becomes a very important
factor for the host nation threat. This shows then that the changes seen and described above are
not an artifact of the once-through analysis.
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Figure 5.2 Proliferation resistance of the CONFU fuel cycle with new "plausible" weights
5.2 Extreme Author-Defined Weights
A second check on the robustness of the results in the face of changing weights involves
using extreme values. For this test, the directional changes made in section 5.1 were made more
extreme. The new values are shown in Table 5.2, with the values from section 5.1 in parentheses
for reference.
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Table 5.2 Extreme weight values
Weight (wi) (prev. weight)
Metric Subnational Host State
Throughput 0.01 (0.02) 0.13 (0.10)
Decay Heat from Pu 0.11 (0.08) 0.08 (0.07)
Spontaneous Fission 0.07 (0.06) 0.17 (0.13)
Separability 0.03 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04)
Concentration 0.04 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06)
Radioactivity 0.19 (0.20) 0.11 (0.10)
Facility Type 0.10 (0.20) 0.03 (0.07)
Process -- Counting 0.04 (0.05) 0.06 (0.06)
Detectability 0.09 (0.10) 0.08 (0.08)
Enrichment 0.27 (0.20) 0.12 (0.12)
Mass and Bulk 0.05 (0.05) 0.07 (0.07)
Total 1.00 0.90
For the once-through fuel cycle, shown in Figure 5.3, the host nation proliferation
resistance values have dropped even further from the Chapter 4 base case values. This makes
sense: the spontaneous fission value is even higher, so the presence of plutonium makes the
back-end host nation values especially low. The front-end host-nation values do not significantly
change, but interestingly, the subnational values at the front end increase with these new weights.
The reason for this is probably the extremely high weight value for enrichment. The
enrichment utility value is very high throughout the cycle, and with such a large weighting, it
dominates at the front end for the subnational. At the back end, the presence of plutonium
begins to play a role, and the enrichment is no longer the dominant metric (despite the fact that
the utility has decreased slightly and still has high weighting). Now spontaneous fission and
decay heat play a role, and the proliferation resistance for the subnational falls.
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Figure 5.3 Proliferation resistance of the once-through cycle with extreme weighting
The CONFU fuel cycle (Figure 5.4), as before, exhibits behavior similar to that seen in
the back end of the once-through fuel cycle. This further confirms the trends identified in the
preceding paragraphs: a more extreme spontaneous fission weight leads to a larger drop in host-
nation proliferation resistance.
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Figure 5.4 CONFU proliferation resistance with extreme weights
One other strange consequence of this new weighting scheme is that transportation
segments actually appear less vulnerable than stationary segments to the host nation threat. The
reason is that the "facility type" weight is now very small. Therefore, moving from a batch
process like fabrication to item-based transportation actually dominates the direction of change
in proliferation resistance. Before, the decrease due to transportation was more important; now
the process as amenable to counting renders transportation actually safer.
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5.3 "Randomly" Chosen Weights
A third check on the methodology evaluates the effect of randomly chosen weights. A
full analysis of this effect would involve randomly-generated weight values (i.e. through some
algorithm) and would try several different random sets. As an approximate first check, we
present here just one set of "random" values that were chosen arbitrarily by the author. They are
not entirely outrageous; they are random but not full of extreme values. The values are shown in
Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 "Random" (author-chosen) weighting values
Weight (wi)
Metric Subnational Host State
Throughput 0.08 0.04
Decay Heat from Pu 0.02 0.02
Spontaneous Fission 0.15 0.1
Separability 0.09 0.09
Concentration 0.15 0.01
Radioactivity 0.1 0.17
Facility Type 0.03 0.06
Process -- Counting 0.1 0.06
Detectability 0.09 0.08
Enrichment 0.07 0.25
Mass and Bulk 0.12 0.02
Total 1.00 0.90
The proliferation resistance graphs for the once-through and CONFU fuel cycles, shown
in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, exhibit some trends similar to the base case and the above scenarios.
Subnational proliferation resistance is generally above host nation resistance, and the once-
through front-end segments have relatively high proliferation resistance. Other conclusions
about proliferation resistance, however, appear different for this weighting scheme.
106
Proliferation Resistance of the Once-Through
Fuel Cycle: "Random" Weights
o 0.9
. 0.8
S0.7
CC 0.6
o0 0.5
i 0.4
0.3
0 0.2
0.1
u I I I I I I
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Time (years)
Figure 5.5 Once-through proliferation resistance with random weighting
One major difference, apparent in Figure 5.5, is the very high proliferation resistance of
the loading step vs. the fabrication step; there is a very marked increase for the subnational threat.
This is due to the now-high weight value for the "process as amenable to counting" metric.
While batch processing is employed at fabrication plants, the item processing used at the loading
step renders it more proliferation resistant. With a high weight value, this difference dominates
the shape for the subnational threat.
In addition, the transport steps no longer appear so vulnerable. Only a slight dip exists at
the back-end transportation step, and the proliferation resistance of the first transport step is
essentially equal to the fabrication value. The reason is that both threats have relatively low
weights for "facility type."
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Figure 5.6 CONFU proliferation resistance with "random" weights
The proliferation resistances of transport steps are similarly high in Figure 5.6. The very
high "process as amenable to counting" weight means that, strangely, the first transport step is
one of the safest against a subnational threat. Spontaneous fission and mass/bulk utilities are
both low at the beginning of the CONFU fuel cycle (recall that this is the second recycle);
because the weights for both of these metrics are so abnormally high for the subnational threat,
the fabrication and loading steps have low proliferation resistance.
The final step of this CONFU cycle is reprocessing. This remains the step with lowest
proliferation resistance, because the material has decreased in radioactivity and is relatively easy
to separate from aqueous flows. Separability and radioactivity still have high weight values, so
this step still dominates in vulnerability.
The test with "random" variables thus shows some significant dependency of the results
on the weights chosen. Indeed, extremely different weights can lead to different conclusions
about where vulnerabilities lie. For example, the strange weighting scheme employed in this
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section showed transportation segments to be equally or less vulnerable than stationary segments.
This counters our expectation for once-through and CONFU fuel cycles. Even so, this variability
with weight values is relatively small. Presuming that experts can agree roughly on the relative
weights, the results should show the same overall vulnerabilities and general shape of
proliferation resistance through a given fuel cycle. This may not be true if the experts differ
substantially; in that case, this methodology may not give consistent results and perhaps should
not be used.
The methodology could be helpful, however, in finding the effect of different weighting
assumptions on the results. If experts disagree on the relative importance of the metrics, but
agree on the expected proliferation resistance outcome, the methodology could help resolve the
debate. This application of the methodology is explored further in Chapter 6.
5.4 Multiplicative Weighting Function Structure
We chose to use a weighted-additive function to aggregate utility values because it is
most simple. The aggregation involves no complicated calculation, and would thus be easily
communicated to policymakers and the lay public. Furthermore, weighted-additive functions are
often utilized in MAUT analyses. One such example is Charlton's work on proliferation
resistance. [29]
Others, like Boscher and Visosky, choose to use multiplicative aggregation functions.
Utilities (or other quantities) are calculated individually for several metrics, and then they are
multiplied together and result in a single proliferation resistance (or proliferation vulnerability)
measure (see Figure 4.3). In order to explore the sensitivity of this methodology's results to the
weighting function structure, the weights were eliminated and utility values multiplied together.
The results are shown in Figure 5.7 for the once-through fuel cycle. The equation for the new
weighting function is:
11
1Ui( X i ) (9)
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where xi is the input to utility function i, and ui is the utility value for metric i. The "reactor" step
values are set arbitrarily far below 0.9 and 1.0 in order to preserve detail on the remainder of the
graph.
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resistance of the once-through fuel cycle with multiplicative
In general, the proliferation resistance of the once-through fuel cycle looks similar to that
calculated using the additive function. One difference is that the front-end values are far lower
than back-end values. This seems to indicate that the front-end of the fuel cycle is a bigger
proliferation risk, but there is no plutonium present at those stages. In fact, the proliferation
resistance value is identically zero at both transport steps. This is a problem with a
multiplicative function: if one utility value is zero, then the total proliferation resistance is
likewise equal to zero. The transportation utility function therefore sets the system function at
zero. Similarly, the radioactivity of the 5% enriched uranium found at the front-end of the fuel
cycle is very low. Because the "radioactivity" utility values are extremely small, they dominate
the entire proliferation resistance value and bring it essentially to zero for fabrication and loading.
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In the process, information is lost; we learn nothing about how other metrics may be affecting
the results at those stages.
Furthermore, all metrics are "equal" under a multiplicative function. There is no
weighting scheme. In effect, each utility function has a weight associated with its structure: if a
utility function is more likely to have a low value, for example, that will give that metric greater
impact. The range and form of a single utility function can easily mask the affects of all other
metrics. Another check was performed on the CONFU fuel cycle, shown in Figure 5.8.
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The results from the CONFU fuel cycle look quite similar to the original base-case
graphs. The first transportation segment is apparent, as are the usual fabrication-loading-
cooling-reprocessing values. As in Figure 5.7, the transportation steps have proliferation
resistance values equal to zero. The last step has proliferation resistance equal to zero as well,
because the "process as amenable to counting" is set to zero at the reprocessing facility. The
same problems of lost information are thus apparent for other fuel cycle types than once-through.
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One important note is the difference in the y-axis scales of Figures 5.7 and 5.8. For
CONFU, the proliferation resistance values are generally a whole order of magnitude larger than
those of the once-through cycle. The reason for this is that the "radioactivity" and "spontaneous
fission" utilities are much lower for the once-through fuel cycle. There is no radioactivity at the
front-end of once-through; that value is thus \especially low. Though radiation increases
dramatically for the once-through fuel cycle at the back-end, the spontaneous fission rate drops
compared to the CONFU back-end spontaneous fission rate. Multiplying all utility functions
means that low values dominate, and this is the behavior we see in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.
5.5 Combined Additive/Multiplicative Weighting Function Structure
The final test of methodology sensitivity involves setting the weighting function to a
combined additive/multiplicative structure. The equation for this weighting function is:
PR,,e = (WdhUdecay'heat + Wfsrj pontfiss + Wrad radioactivity + Wdtcb detectability + Wenr enrichment)
(Wacacility + proc process + Wthru thruput + Wmb Umassbulk ) (10)
( w one concentration + W p separability
where PRseg is the proliferation resistance of a segment seg, w is the weight of the respective
metric (weights are those identified in Chapter 2), and u is the utility value of the respective
segment. All 11 weights add to one for the subnational actor, and to 0.9 for a host nation threat.
They are thus exactly those used in Chapter 2. The metrics are roughly grouped so that the first
five (decay heat, spontaneous fission, radioactivity, detectability, and enrichment) are all
"material properties," the following metrics (facility type, process as amenable to counting,
throughput, and mass and bulk) are characteristics related to "removing the material from a
facility," and the final two metrics (concentration and separability) involve "material
processing." An alternative weight structure would have each group's weights sum to one. This
was not explored here. The idea is to isolate metrics that are somewhat (or entirely) dependent
on one another and add them together, and then to multiply only relatively independent
quantities. This weight structure produces results shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.10.
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Figure 5.9 shows the proliferation resistance of the once-through fuel cycle. It shows
several now-familiar trends, including a dip for the second transportation segment and host
nation values consistently higher than those for a subnational. One point of note is that the graph
most closely resembling Figure 5.9 is that produced by the "random" weighting function above
(Figure 5.5). Both Figures 5.9 and 5.5 show higher proliferation resistance at the loading step,
and virtually no difference between the fabrication value and the first transportation step value.
By contrast, the CONFU fuel cycle exhibits results from the combined function that most
resemble those from the "author-defined" weights of section 5.1.
One significant drawback of this particular weighting function structure is that the
"driving" utility values are not easily apparent. Answering why Figures 5.9 and 5.10 in fact
resemble different previous calculation structures is a difficult task.
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For first guesses, it is clear that the "separability" and "concentration" metrics will have a
large impact on the final proliferation resistance value. They, together, have a multiplicative
effect on all other metrics. This may partly explain why the "random" weights of section 5.3
produce a graph similar to that in Figure 5.9: the "random" weights chosen for concentration and
separability (at least for the subnational) are particularly high.
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Figure 5.10 Proliferation resistance of the CONFU fuel cycle using a combined
additive/multiplicative weighting function
The graphs in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show, as do some others in this section, a dampening
of the proliferation resistance drop at transportation segments. Expert judgment is needed to
decide the extent to which transportation segments should appear vulnerable for known fuel
cycles. Further examination is also needed to determine if a combined weighting structure is
appropriate for use with this methodology. Deeper examination of the effects of both additive
and combined structures, along with a more thorough knowledge of MAUT and aggregation
functions, could help decide which function is best.
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Regardless of the ultimate choice in function structure, some important points of the
analysis appear robust. For example, steps that are considered especially vulnerable (like
reprocessing) have low proliferation resistance for both structures. Furthermore, for both
structures, the subnational proliferation resistance is generally above (or very close to) the host
nation value.
Changes in both the weights and weighting function structure thus do not produce wildly
differing results. Though far more work is needed to fully demonstrate the robustness of the
Chapter 2 weighting scheme, it appears to be fairly solid in the face of various changes. There is
some variability between results, however, and this indicates that the numerical values may not
be particularly quantitatively valuable. The goal of the methodology is to observe changes in the
system (i.e. in the utilities themselves), but it is clear that weights and structure have at least
some effect on the proliferation resistance values. The significance of numerical values is
discussed in the final chapter.
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Chapter 6 - Final Conclusions
6.1 Using the Model to Compare Fuel Cycles
Because the results mostly agree with expectations on a qualitative level, the
methodology may be useful for analyzing the proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear
systems. Analysis of the well-understood once-through and MOX fuel cycles, explained in
Chapter 4, demonstrates alignment with expected proliferation resistance trends. This means
then that the results produced for the CONFU and ABR fuel cycles may be insightful.
For example, if the robustness of the results is demonstrated, the ABR analysis shows
that the cycle with conversion ratio 0.0 is more proliferation resistant than the CR = 1.0 cycle.
More time and resources will be needed to develop experience with fuels and reactors operating
at low conversion ratios. This result indicates that the extra money could be worthwhile: not
only will CR = 0.0 reactors burn more TRU, they will also be more resistant to proliferation.
Demonstrating the proliferation benefit for CR = 0.0 could influence decision-makers to more
highly prioritize research at low conversion ratios.
The utility of these results, however, hinges strongly on showing that the methodology is
sound. Only if the results stand up to further sensitivity analyses should the results influence the
decisions of safeguarders. Furthermore, the very basis of the model needs further examination.
Charlton's work with utility functions has been both acclaimed and critiqued; the equations and
scales that make up the utility functions, at this time, are still essentially arbitrary. If experts
agree that the general structure of these functions does not adequately represent proliferation
risks, the methodology will not be appropriate or useful. It is thus not the intention of this thesis
to state any definitive results at this time. The observation that transportation segments are
especially vulnerable to proliferation, for example, is not yet proven.
The following sections discuss the primary weaknesses with the methodology, and
provide recommendations for testing and strengthening the validity of the model. Finally, the
last section places this proliferation resistance assessment in the context of others and discusses
the ultimate utility of the method.
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6.2 Uncertainty in the Weighting Function
As mentioned in multiple sections and in Chapter five, the weighting function is a
significant source of uncertainty and subjectivity. The weights are subjectively derived, with
some influence from previous proliferation resistance assessments, and the function structure
was arbitrarily chosen for its simplicity. Furthermore, initial runs with the model seemed to
show that the numerical proliferation resistance values were fairly sensitive to the utility weights.
Some subjective decisions must be made within every proliferation resistance analysis.
The problem is endemic to all analysis types, and invites intense skepticism. An analyst must
choose which metrics to include, and how important they are relative to one another in the final
assessment of proliferation risk. So far, there is no universally accepted set of metrics or general
understanding of their relative importance. Until one becomes available, any proliferation
resistance assessment will include considerable uncertainty. Yet everything should be done to
reduce such uncertainty as much as possible.
Recommendation: Further research is needed to determine the sensitivity of the
methodology to the weighting function values and structure. Analysis should be performed by
choosing at least two or three other function structures, including multiplicative and esoteric
combinations, to determine if structure significantly changes the results. Within these and the
original function structure, the weight values should be varied across realistic and wild ranges to
determine their effect as well. Random weights should be computer-generated, and if possible,
hundreds of cases involving different utility values, weights, and function structures should be
compared.
If the general trends and values stand up to such tests (as they more or less did in the tests
of Chapter 5), and the conclusions drawn are the same (or if the "wilder" and usual changes
happen in an expected manner), the methodology may be useful for analyzing advanced nuclear
systems. If this is the case, formal processes of expert elicitation can determine appropriate
weights and perhaps the best choices for function structure. If, on the other hand, the results are
unexplainable and demonstrate extreme variability, indicating different conclusions can be
drawn for the same system, the methodology should be scrutinized further. Likely, if this latter
case proves true, the methodology may need to be abandoned entirely.
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6.3 Significance of Numerical Differences
Another potential difficulty with the model is that the differences between final
proliferation resistance values, both within and across fuel cycles, are small. The test cases
analyzed in Chapter 4 do not provide any information on the significance of the numerical results.
It may be that the proliferation risks posed by the various fuel cycles and steps are similar in
shape, or that the small differences of 0.1 or 0.2 proliferation resistance points represent stark
differences in risk.
During the cooling step, for example, the fuel composition is changing very slightly as
the constituents decay. There are no other changes to the fuel, and correctly, the proliferation
resistance for all fuel cycles is virtually flat. This shows that small changes in the material,
largely insignificant to a proliferator, show up as insignificant on the proliferation resistance
graphs. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the jumps and differences present in the
graphs are significant.
In fact, some evidence (see Chapter 4) indicates that the jumps, e.g. from stationary to
transport steps, are caused by one or a few utility function changes. If people generally agree
that transport steps are far more risky than stationary facilities, then the differences in
proliferation values shown on the graph may represent an appropriate difference in risk estimate.
In other circumstances, however, the connection may not be so clear. For example, if one
compares the proliferation resistance values of two different fuels at the cooling step, the
difference might be about the same as that for transport vs. stationary. But the reasons for the
difference might be a more complex grouping of radioactivity, decay heat, and other factors.
Taken together, these factors might or might not suggest in reality that the two fuel types have
the same relative risk as transport/stationary fuel.
Ideally, the methodology would incorporate risk information in the metric choices, utility
functions, and weighting structure. Cost information could theoretically be built-in in a
systematic way. Each utility function would accurately reflect the relative cost to society of the
material characteristics: i.e. as material quality improved, the utility function would show a
directly corresponding decrease in proliferation resistance. The correspondence would reflect
the increase in cost were a nuclear weapon of this material to be detonated. The weighting
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function would take this one step further by ensuring that the combined effects of different
metrics were accurately accounted in the final proliferation resistance values.
Yet the task of implementing connections between the costs of a nuclear explosion and
the characteristics of civilian material is extremely daunting. If cost scales could be established
and vetted by experts, the framework would shed a considerable amount of subjectivity. But not
all attributes are easily linked to final outcomes, and even fewer can be accurately costed. It is
difficult to know, for example, exactly how an increase in spontaneous fission rate corresponds
to a decrease in the cost to society of a nuclear detonation (and indeed, any estimate would need
to be represented by a probability function).
The issue of numerical significance cannot be ignored, because ultimately, policymakers
will ask the question "how vulnerable is vulnerable?" The prioritization and ranking of
vulnerabilities is important when a decision needs to be made. Trends and qualitative statements,
such as "this segment is more vulnerable than another," are not enough. Furthermore, numerical
statements (such as graphs) are dangerous: they can sometimes have a disproportionate impact
on people who lack the mathematical background to scrutinize them. Certain decision-makers,
lacking in analytical skills and (perhaps irrationally) trusting numbers, might wholly accept the
differences and numerical values they see as absolute.
What policymakers would love to see, and would properly interpret, are ranked lists, that
show: (1) where the worst vulnerabilities are, (2) how they compare in terms of ultimate cost to
society, and (3) the cost of alleviating the risks at each point. The perfect analysis would be one
that optimizes the cost relationship, showing how to remove as much of the severe risk as
possible while paying the smallest amount.
This optimization will likely remain elusive (and should it appear, readers should be
skeptical of the supporting assumptions). In the optimization's absence, effort is needed to
connect real risks and costs with analysis results like those above. Probabilistic methods are a
good step in this direction, as probability examinations produce results that are somewhat clearer
to the decision-maker. Outcomes shown to be "X% more probable than others" are fairly easy to
understand. Furthermore, connections are actually more robust because propagating
probabilities through a proliferation analysis framework forces the analyst to constantly connect
material attributes and numerical significances. MAUT-style analyses, with their constructed
scales, leave these connections more opaque.
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Recommendations: To move forward with computerized proliferation resistance
analyses, the first question to be answered is whether it makes sense, given the above, to
abandon MAUT methods in favor of probabilistic frameworks. It may be that establishing a type
of probability-based pathway analysis is no more daunting than interpreting MAUT-based
numerical results. If this is the case, a large body of exploration will be required to validate a
probabilistic methodology.
If, on the other hand, MAUT methods are still favored or desired for a certain evaluation,
greater care and attention should go to connecting each metric and associated function to actual
costs of nuclear proliferation. The "separability" and "mass and bulk" utility functions described
in Chapter 2 are examples of how such connections can be made. Refined research into the true
costs could greatly improve those and all other utility functions. More research might also
further the development of a weighting function. If the function could take into account some of
the dependencies and interactions between metrics, the resulting proliferation resistance values
would be more numerically significant. Finally, examination and adjustment by experts could
help fine-tune the attribute-cost connections.
6.4 The Uranium Problem
Much has been made of the dangers of plutonium. For decades, proliferation concern has
focused on the back-end of the fuel cycle, and especially on reprocessing plants using PUREX
and producing pure Pu. Uranium, however, is a formidable nuclear weapon material. It is
actually easier to construct a weapon from weapons-grade uranium than from correspondingly
attractive plutonium. The low heat and spontaneous fission rates allow for a "gun-type" rather
than implosion detonation scheme, and render uranium material far less detectable than
plutonium.[26] As a result, proliferation analysts have long been concerned that uranium
enrichment facilities might be as or more dangerous than plutonium processing plants.
The proliferation resistance values for the once-through cycle, cited in Chapter 4, show
that the fabrication step has somewhat low proliferation resistance. The discussion there
explores possible reasons for this, and concludes that the effects of radiation and decay heat in
spent fuel may balance with the lack of suitable weapon material at the front-end of the cycle.
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In general, the front-end of the once-through fuel cycle deserves further examination. In
essence, making a uranium bomb requires overcoming just a single large technical hurdle; a
proliferator must "simply" obtain enriched material. By contrast, for a plutonium weapon, a
proliferator would have not only to secure material, but also would need to build and detonate a
complex device. Separating material and building a uranium explosive are non-trivial
requirements, but in general, most analysts seem to agree that the primary difficulties number
two for plutonium and one for uranium.
Given then that a uranium bomb can be built by overcoming just one large technical issue,
it makes sense that the enrichment step be in sharp focus; and the fabrication step, with uranium
above its natural enrichment state, might be a minor vulnerability as well. In any case, it is clear
that any methodology to assess proliferation resistance should not concentrate on plutonium risks
to the exclusion of those associated with uranium.
Recommendations: A better understanding is needed of the comparative risks posed by
uranium and plutonium, beginning with research centered on quantifying the ease with which
each bomb type is constructed. Also helpful would be studies that place the various technical
hurdles in the context of different proliferation routes. To what extent does technical difficulty
make a difference for a host nation operating by breakout, vs. one operating by material
diversion?
In sum, this analysis, and likely others, would benefit from greater knowledge about the
technical differences between uranium and plutonium. Studies that dig deep to characterize the
proliferation resistance attributes, and technical and proliferation-related assumptions, will help
clarify the different roles the materials play. Comparisons with other material types, like
neptunium-237, may also be helpful as well.
6.5 Model Testing
Once the above adjustments and explorations are done, the methodology needs even
more extensive testing than that demonstrated here. The single form of assessment performed so
far involved application of the framework to known and new fuel cycles, and comparing results
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to qualitative expectations as well as to previous proliferation resistance analyses. These checks
are useful, but far more needs to be done before the method is verified as accurately informative.
Recommendations: After the suggestions above are followed, for further development
of the methodology, it should undergo rigorous testing. Such testing should include sensitivity
analyses of the metric values, to see how swings in attributes affect final outcomes. Different
(and perhaps strange) materials should be evaluated, and their results compared to expectation or
previous study. Experts should vet various aspects of the study, especially the metric choices
and weighting function. Further changes should be introduced to examine any dependency
between metrics.
6.6 Final Conclusions
Like all models, fuel cycle simulations and proliferation resistance assessments can never
be perfectly accurate. Computerized simulations of the nuclear fuel cycle are necessarily broad
and include many approximations. It is unrealistic to expect that a proliferation resistance
analysis, conducted in combination with a fuel cycle simulation, will be any more precise.
Indeed, the uncertainties in fuel cycle models will be propagated through to proliferation models,
and the proliferation models themselves will add their own contributions to the error space.
Analysts hope that despite this inherent imprecision, some information can come of
making rough approximations and performing the assessment. Indeed, a rough sketch of
proliferation resistance characteristics can lend some clarity to decision-making on protecting the
fuel cycle. If done correctly, an assessment like that attempted above could help NNSA and
DOE focus on the important vulnerabilities in civilian nuclear power. Further analysis would be
required at more advanced design stages. Such later analyses would go deeper and build on the
broad-brush information generated by early simulations.
Even early assessments, however, should be performed with care. While rough sketches
including approximations are appropriate and useful, hastily-made methods that give potentially
incorrect results can be damaging. Not all readers will think critically and carefully about the
nuances of an analysis. Instead, readers and decision-makers might accept the results before
them, and use such results to justify actions that ultimately do not serve the goal of making the
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nuclear fuel cycle safer. Money spent on improving trivial aspects of security is wasted, and
ignoring significant vulnerabilities in the nuclear sector is potentially catastrophic.
Yet any proliferation resistance assessment has the potential to be useful. While most
assessments are performed with an eye toward informing decisions, the utility of the analysis is
not necessarily highest for political decision-makers. The analyst achieves deep insight to the
sources of proliferation concern just by attempting the assessment. Working to understand the
factors that contribute to proliferation decisions, and their interdependence and relative
importance, the analyst learns about the intricacies of the connection between nuclear power and
nuclear weapons. If the analyst can then present this knowledge while deemphasizing the
absolute "correctness" of the results, the assessment can serve as a strong basis for discussion.
Segmenting the problem can focus arguments and ideas on protecting the fuel cycle.
Understanding points of disagreement on the relative importance of certain material
characteristics, for example, can shorten the time needed to reach decision resolutions. Whether
as an exercise in knowledge acquisition or as a useful framework, adjusted as suggested above,
this methodology will hopefully add constructive shape to the quest for proliferation-resistant
civilian nuclear power systems.
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